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AN EARLY TRAGEDY OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
FRANK GOODNOW AND THE CHINESE REPUBLIC
Jedidiah Kroncke†
Abstract: This article recovers a lost episode in the neglected early history of
comparative constitutionalism in the United States. In 1913, pioneering comparative
lawyer Frank Goodnow went to China to assist the new Chinese Republic in the writing
of its first constitution. Goodnow’s mission reflected the growing interest of the United
States in China’s legal development in this era, and his constitution-writing project won
broad support from the U.S. legal profession. Goodnow’s tenure ultimately generated
great controversy when he advised China’s leaders to adopt a constitutional monarchy
rather than continue on as a republic. This article describes this controversy and how the
international engagement of the United States was increasingly shaped in the early
twentieth century by the attempted export of U.S. legal models as a presumptively
altruistic mechanism of modernization. Goodnow’s allegiance to comparative legal
science agitated against this more parochial view of legal internationalism, and in the end
he was excommunicated from U.S. foreign policy affairs.
More broadly, this article shows how the early history of comparative
constitutionalism in the United States had its roots in the early twentieth century
discourse on colonial administration. Goodnow and other U.S. lawyers of the era turned
to indirect engagements with foreign legal reform only after the popular rejection of
colonialism that had been constitutionally sanctioned by the now infamous Insular Cases.
This article further argues that these colonial roots and Goodnow’s feckless misadventure
in China hold key lessons for today’s comparative constitutionalists. It provides a vivid
example of how the technocratic illusion of engaging in depoliticized legal reform abroad
is self-defeating and untenable. Further, it warns against the inherent tensions between a
methodologically coherent comparative law and the desire to export U.S. constitutional
models abroad, and how such tensions can undercut clear-sighted understanding of
foreign legal developments.

†
Senior Research Scholar, Harvard Law School, J.D., Yale; Ph.D., UC Berkeley. Earlier drafts of
this article were greatly improved by the members of the N.Y.U. Golieb Legal History Colloquium, the
Harvard Legal History Workshop, and the panel on Transnational Legal Networks at the 126th American
Historical Association Meetings. For their specific feedback, I would like to thank William Alford, Asli
Bali, Richard Bernstein, Robert Berring, Benjamin Coates, Jerome Cohen, Mary Dudziak, David Fontana,
Robert Gordon, Morton Horwitz, Dan Hulsebosch, Stanley Katz, Maribel Morey, Sara McDougall, Bill
Nelson, Intisar Rabb, Aziz Rana, Frank Upham, and Laura Weinrib.

534

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 21 NO. 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

535

II.

FRANK GOODNOW AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

538

A. The Making of a Comparative Legal Star

539

B.

The Early Twentieth Century Internationalization of U.S. Law

542

C.

From Colonial Administrator to Comparative Constitutionalist

545

D. The Carnegie Endowment and Writing China’s Constitution

549

III. GOODNOW’S COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AS
APPLIED SCIENCE

555

A. Comparative Constitutionalism as Scientific Enterprise

555

B.

Comparative Legal Science and the Primacy of Local Politics

558

C.

From Comparative Lawyer to Expert Propagandist

564

IV. THE NEW AGE FOR U.S. LAW & GOODNOW’S FALL FROM GRACE

569

A. The Transgression of Exporting Monarchy

569

B.

The Shifting Tide of U.S. Legal Internationalism

573

C.

The Inevitable Pitfalls of Eliding Politics Abroad

582

V.

CONCLUSION

587

JUNE 2012

I.

FRANK GOODNOW AND THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

535

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, the American Political Science Association (“APSA”)
inaugurated the first annual Frank Johnson Goodnow Award for distinguished
service.1 The award was meant to “recognize distinguished service to the
profession and the Association, not necessarily a career of scholarship.”2 This
distinction between scholarship and service has to be considered with some
irony, as Goodnow was not only a preeminent comparative lawyer, but also
can be considered the founding figure in study of administrative law in the
United States.3 Though Goodnow’s many institutional accomplishments were
also significant, it is nevertheless true that his place in U.S. legal history is
dim at best. While history is replete with significant and novel thinkers
whose work and influence are lost to the vagaries of time, unraveling
Goodnow’s particular fate has little to do with his work on domestic U.S. law,
but is instead tied to one of the earliest chapters in U.S. comparative
constitutionalism.4
This early chapter in U.S. comparative constitutionalism took place in
the 1910s where many today might least expect it—China. While Goodnow
had risen in the ranks of Progressive legal scholars early in his career, he
found himself at mid-career spending several years participating in a new and
fervent U.S. interest in the new Chinese Republic formed in 1911. In fact, in
the opening decades of the early twentieth century, China had emerged as a
key site within a newly emerging vision of U.S. law’s international influence.
Rejecting the colonial impulses regnant in the expansionist wave of the late
1890s and the Supreme Court’s pro-colonialism decisions in the infamous
Insular Cases, the United States instead embraced new forms of ostensibly
consensual engagement with foreign legal development—the groundwork of
what today would be called “law and development.”5 Goodnow was one of a
1
Goodnow’s service to APSA as an organization was significant; he was the organization’s first
president in 1903. Frederic A. Ogg, Frank Johnson Goodnow, 34 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114, 114 (1940).
2
Id.
3
See Eliza Wing-Yee Lee, Political Science, Public Administration, and the Rise of the American
Administrative State, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 539 (1995); Laurence Lynn, Restoring the Rule of Law to
Public Administration, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 803 (2009).
4
The interest in comparative constitutionalism in America has been growing over the past two
decades. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771. (1997);
Sujit Choudry, Globalization in Search of Justification, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The
Value of Comparative Perspective in Judicial Decision-Making, 74 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 213 (2005); Vicki
Jackson, Constitutional Comparison, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1998).
5
See Brian Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development, 44
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 209 (2011); David Trubek & Mark Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 4 WIS. L.
REV. 1062 (1974).
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generation of legal scholars who had first imagined their international careers
as colonial administrators, but who suddenly found themselves running
reform projects alongside sovereign foreign governments, under both private
and public aegis. Amid this sea change, Goodnow turned his gaze from
reforming the United States’ constitution to reshaping China’s.
The turn of the twentieth century was a turbulent time for U.S. society,
and the opening decade of the twentieth century was transformative for the
U.S. legal profession. Many of the great works of U.S. legal history have
grappled with the wide-ranging effects that industrialization, urbanization,
immigration, and a host of other social developments wrought for U.S.
lawyers.6 These developments eventually reshaped not only the basic ways in
which U.S. lawyers were educated and trained, but also the scope of their
participation in this era of rapid legal and political transformation in the U.S.7
While the domestic stories of these transformations have been well
studied, the international dimensions of these changes have only recently
become the subject of serious inquiry. As Goodnow’s story reveals, U.S.
lawyers played a key role in the early internationalization of U.S. society, and
a role that more often than not intertwined with the increasing prominence of
lawyers domestically. The demise of Goodnow’s career as a leading member
of this new U.S. international legal elite illustrates the shifts that the U.S.
legal community was undergoing in its orientation to foreign legal systems at
this time.
The fusion of new ideas about legal science and the professionalization
of U.S. law had cascading effects across the United States. In the
international arena, these changes helped produce the image of the U.S.
lawyer as a foreign reformer who was working to bring the advancements of
U.S. law to the rest of the world. This noble image unified U.S. lawyers
across the political and legal spectrum.8 Concurrently, the idea that U.S. law
could bring the influence of putatively its greatest achievement—the
Constitution—to foreign nations garnered broad appeal.9 Yet, this idea of
6

See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation in American Law, 1870-1960 (1992); James
W. Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (1950).
7
See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
8
Jedidiah Kroncke, Law & Development as Anti-Comparative Law, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L.
(forthcoming 2012).
9
THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 160 (1999) (noting
that “[t]he image of an American constitutional scholar heading off to foreign lands with copies of the U.S.
Constitution in his or her briefcase, to help constitutionally underdeveloped foreigners, is somehow a
familiar one”); see also Paul Carrington, Writing Other People’s Constitutions, 33 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 167 (2007). For an overview of the mid-twentieth century decline of American comparative
constitutionalism, see David Fontana, The Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Postwar
Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 17 (2011).
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export was still grounded in many of the same evolutionary and paternalistic
assumptions that had structured the U.S. legal community’s now often
forgotten focus on colonial administration during the late 1890s and early
1900s.
Moreover, the idea of the United States as an aggressive exporter of
legal knowledge and institutions abroad was vigorously contested in the early
twentieth century as the nation gradually emerged from its ninteenth-century
status as a neophyte in international legal affairs. At this time, the popularity
of comparative methods was at an all-time high in U.S. law, as many legal
scholars embraced a vibrant transatlantic exchange of legal knowledge and
ideas.10 While the rise and decline of the transatlantic dimensions of this
exchange has been chronicled before,11 scholarship to date has overlooked the
fact that comparativists such as Goodnow were being simultaneously drawn
to efforts to reshape the legal systems of non-Western nations such as China.
Recapturing this development is crucial, as after World War II such export
efforts would serve as the blueprint for U.S. law’s relationship to Western and
non-Western foreign legal systems alike. Just like Goodnow himself, U.S.
law slowly traded legal comparativism for the export of U.S. legal institutions
and ideas in the international legal arena.12
However, instead of serving as an exemplar of this new turn,
Goodnow’s mission to write the Chinese constitution did not inaugurate a
grand beginning to U.S. comparative constitutionalism, but instead was
deemed a great and notorious failure. Goodnow’s actual impact on Chinese
constitutional development was ephemeral and he ultimately became
associated with an attempt to transform the Chinese Republic into a
constitutional monarchy.13 Ironically, Goodnow’s deep commitment to
comparative legal science helped to facilitate this failure and placed him
deeply at odds with the U.S. legal elite who had sponsored his trip.
Goodnow’s unwavering belief that his expertise could generate depoliticized
legal solutions to contentious Chinese problems inevitably rendered his
attempt to influence Chinese constitutionalism ineffective. Yet, this faith also
led him to believe that constitutional monarchy was objectively best suited for
China, an idea that conflicted with the emerging notion that

10
Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, in THE NEW LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); David S. Clark, The Modern
Development of Comparative Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 587 (2007).
11
The classic work on the transatlantic exchange of this era is DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC
CROSSINGS (1998).
12
See Kroncke, supra note 8.
13
See infra Part IV.
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“Americanization” was the inherent goal of U.S. participation in foreign legal
reform.
As a result, following Goodnow’s return from China, he was effectively
excommunicated from international affairs. His excommunication exposed
the fact that U.S. law had begun to dramatically shift away from comparative
law as an intellectual enterprise for domestic consumption to an exportoriented view of international engagement. Further, his excommunication
exposed how both stateside defenses and criticisms of Goodnow’s work
served to warp U.S. perceptions of foreign legal development that were
premised on the shared assumption that the U.S. could and should influence
the direction of Chinese legal development.
Quite directly then, this early episode of failed comparative
constitutionalism contains crucial lessons and questions for today’s new wave
of comparative constitutions. It forcefully presents basic questions about the
very nature of their enterprise and what ends such work ultimately serves.
To elucidate these claims and present the details of Goodnow’s life as
a comparative constitutionalist, this article proceeds in three parts. Part II
outlines Goodnow’s rise to prominence in Progressive legal circles as a
comparative legal scholar and discusses the significance of his appointment
as constitutional adviser to China in this early era of the internationalization
of U.S. law. Part III details Goodnow’s actual tenure as adviser and analyzes
the root causes of both his failure to influence Chinese constitutionalism and
his attempts to shape U.S. perceptions of Chinese legal development. Part
IV shows how Goodnow’s endorsement of constitutional monarchy for
China received a mixed but ultimately negative response in the United
States, while also illustrating how his belief in depoliticized legal expertise
led him to be manipulated by China’s failed monarchist, Yuan Shikai. The
article concludes by arguing that Goodnow’s failure as a comparativist is
more than just a minor historical chapter in an important transitional period
in the legal history, but rather presents a set of probative lessons for today’s
newly emerging and enthusiastic comparative constitutionalists.
II.

FRANK GOODNOW AND THE EARLY HISTORY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

OF

COMPARATIVE

It is fitting to begin with the fact that there is no official biography of
Frank Goodnow. Given his prominence as a leading intellectual and
institutional actor of his day, this omission is instantly telling. At the same
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time, his fame in his day makes the general outline of his life easy to
recover.14
A.

The Making of a Comparative Legal Star

Frank Johnson Goodnow was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1859.
The son of a successful entrepreneur, his career developed as a product of his
personal passions, as he never required income from regular employment. He
graduated from Amherst College in 1879 and subsequently moved to
Columbia University, where he earned his L.L.B. in 1882. After a brief stint
in a law office, he was offered the opportunity to teach administrative law at
Columbia. Indicative of the cosmopolitanism of the era, he was given this
opportunity with the condition that he travel to Europe for further study. As
such, before beginning at Columbia in 1884, he studied at the Ecole Libre des
Sciences Politiques in France and the University of Berlin in Germany.15
Goodnow’s early career reflected the shifting terrain of U.S. legal study
and education. While he had received post-graduate training in law, his
appointment at Columbia was in the recently-established political science
department, not in a dedicated law school. Furthermore, before he became a
full professor, he completed a separate doctorate in political science beyond
his L.L.B. He was resistant to the then-nascent Langdellian revolution in
legal education that sought to segregate the university study of law based on a
professional post-graduate model, although he would eventually hold a joint
appointment with Columbia’s law school.16
Goodnow’s early focus was on administrative law. He was among the
early pioneers whose work in this field was largely ignored by law schools,
who viewed administrative law as in tension with the common law tradition.17
Goodnow’s first major publication came in 1886, titled The Executive and the
Courts.18 In this article, he presaged one of the emerging issues of
governance that would come to define debates over administrative law in the
U.S.: the tension between a juridical rule of law and the authority of
scientific expertise.19
14

Biographical information on Frank Goodnow is derived from various sources present in the
archives at Johns Hopkins University. FRANK JOHNSON GOODNOW PAPERS MS. 3 (Special Collection,
Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University) [hereinafter GOODNOW PAPERS].
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See Christopher Langdell, Teaching Law as a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 145 (1887); Marcia
Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science, 5 VT. L. REV. 1 (1980).
18
Frank J. Goodnow, The Executive and the Courts, 1 POL. SCI. Q. 533 (1886).
19
See Lynn, supra note 3.
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Goodnow’s 1893 publication, Comparative Administrative Law,
catapulted him into the firmament of Progressive-era thought.20 At the time
of its publication, this work was by far the most systematic treatment of
administrative law as a coherent subject of scholarly inquiry ever produced,
and it remains a monument of comparative legal analysis. He drew on a wide
range of sources to compare the rising U.S. administrative state with those of
France, England, and Germany.
Emblematic of his broad general
methodological gaze, the scope of his empirical references included Prussia,
Holland, and, significantly, the separate legal traditions of individual U.S.
states. He delved deeply into not only theory but also the function of
administrative law within these distinct legal systems, and avoided the
seductive pitfall of comparative textualism. While he saw that all societies
faced common challenges in governance, he understood that each legal
system not only attempted to solve pragmatic problems but did so through
solutions that aspired to express very different political values.
Essential to understanding Goodnow’s comparative work was that he
saw himself as a participant in the trans-Atlantic intellectual world. Many
have cited the early twentieth century as the great flowering of comparative
law when foreign legal ideas had a wide-ranging impact on U.S. law.21 It was
indeed a time when U.S. reformers felt free to use European examples as the
basis for U.S. legal reforms.22 Thus, at this time comparative law was not
solely the isolated study of foreign legal systems by specialized scholars, but
was seen as a broader commitment to comparative methods throughout legal
scholarship that aimed to produce actionable knowledge for domestic
reform.23
Moreover, Goodnow’s comparative work showed no parochial
favoritism, and he was dispassionate in his analysis of what he saw as the
flaws of U.S. law. He truly believed in a universal social science, one to
which no existing assumption or institution was sacrosanct or beyond
analysis. Goodnow also possessed the characteristic Progressive belief in the
potential for social progress to be promoted through the application of expert
knowledge, and he firmly believed that his scientific work was in the public

20

FRANK J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1893).
See John F. Witt, Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist Beginnings of American Civil
Liberties, 54 DUKE L.J. 705, 710 n 15 (2004).
22
See RODGERS, supra note 11; Kennedy, supra note 10.
23
See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION 4 (1886) (Stating that “[w]hy
should we not use such parts of foreign contrivances as we want, if they be in any way serviceable? We are
in no danger of using them in a foreign way. We borrowed rice, but we do not eat it with chopsticks.”).
21
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interest.24 In sum, he made it very clear that the study of law should be, like
all legal analysis, part of an inherently comparative science.25 In this respect,
Goodnow should be considered a founding scholar of modern U.S.
comparative law.26
The strength of Goodnow’s commitment to comparative law led him
into controversial territory in his day, as his vigorous critique of existing U.S.
legal and political institutions rankled more conservative sensibilities. Yet,
the social tumult of his era was one in which active political engagement
could be coupled with the contemplation of quite significant deviations from
what was then considered to be the traditional Anglo-American legal heritage
of the United States. In his 1899 review of Henry Jones Ford’s The Rise and
Growth of American Politics, Goodnow praised the unwritten
constitutionalism of England and claimed that England’s recent innovations in
governance were due to the comparative advantage they enjoyed from not
being bound by “a written constitution not susceptible of easy amendment.”27
Goodnow would again express a deep critique of U.S. institutions in his
1900 treatise Politics and Administration.28 There he claimed that U.S.
governance was captured by party politics rather than by popular will; with an
irony soon to be revealed, he criticized the power politics of party leaders
using the villainous archetype of “the Boss.”29 He repeatedly invoked a need
to critically emulate England,30 and drew examples from many nations,
including a call for the adoption of Australian balloting procedures.31
A few years later, Goodnow would publish another book wherein he
critiqued the notion that the Anglo-American legal tradition rejected his own
reform agenda as foreign and unwelcome.32 He claimed that such a discourse
24
See LISA ANDERSON, PURSUING TRUTH, EXERCISING POWER: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2003); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, 1 (1967)
(describing the “new scientific gospel”).
25
GOODNOW, supra note 20, at iv (stating that “this knowledge can be obtained only by study, and
by comparison of our own with foreign administrative models”).
26
Fellow hybrid law professor-political scientist Thomas Reed Powell commented on Comparative
Administrative Law after Goodnow’s passing, saying “[b]y means of this survey he was enabled to set the
stakes for the field of American administrative law and to work out the boundaries within which a distinct
branch of legal science was to develop.” Ogg, supra note 1, at 116.
27
Frank J. Goodnow, Book Review, 14 POL. SCI. Q. 156 (1899).
28
FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 198 (1900).
29
Id. (stating “the political storm centre in the U.S. is therefore not in the government, but in the
party”).
30
“Let us follow her examples, not so much in attempting any exact imitation of what she has done,
as in adopting her frame of mind and in evincing the same willingness which she has shown, to adapt her
governmental system to changed conditions.” Id. at 263.
31
Id. at 241-42.
32
FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1905).
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elided the functional purpose of law in favor of an atavistic worship of the
past as success and failure were found everywhere in the human world.33
During this era, the ascendency of Progressive legal thought was far
from universal or uncritically accepted, but Goodnow’s perspective was
becoming the norm among a range of U.S. elites who were emboldened by a
kindred sense of scientific possibility, if not always-careful erudition.
B.

The Early Twentieth Century Internationalization of U.S. Law

Goodnow’s deep critiques of U.S. law were developed during a time
when U.S. lawyers were at the center of vibrant arguments over the proper
shape of the United States’ increasingly prominent role in international
relations. Prior to the early twentieth century, the often grand rhetorical
statements about the exceptional nature of U.S. law had been tightly
constrained by the United States’ practical status as a fledging postcolonial
nation. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, U.S. lawyers had been
more interested in gaining a sense of parity and respect in the arena of
international law than popular rhetorical assertions concerning the United
States’s exceptional legal character might otherwise misleadingly represent.34
While U.S. lawyers had long trumpeted U.S. law in foreign contexts,
especially the achievement of the United States Constitution,35 it was not until
the turn of the twentieth century that the United States as a nation was able to
confidently assert its exceptional legal character in the form of an active
foreign policy overseas.36
Basic questions about the shape of modern U.S. internationalism were
placed center stage during the 1890s in the aftermath of the SpanishAmerican War and the acquisition of foreign territories outside of the United
States’ continental bounds.37 Americans fiercely debated whether the U.S.
republican tradition was compatible with forms of European colonial empire

33

Id.
See Daniel J. Hulsebosch & David M. Golove, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932
(2010).
35
See GEORGE A. BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD ROUND THE WORLD, 1776-1989
(2009).
36
Scholars of American foreign policy have long noted that idealized versions of American history
are normatively structured and are offered as carrying implied lessons for foreign nations. See RUSSELL L.
HANSON, THE DEMOCRATIC IMAGINATION IN AMERICA: CONVERSATIONS WITH OUR PAST 424 (1985);
WALTER L. HIXSON, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 8 (2008).
37
See SALLY MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAII (1999); ARTHUR POWER DUDDEN, THE AMERICAN
PACIFIC (1992); EFREN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY (2001); EDIBERTO
ROMAN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES (2006).
34
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from which many had long tried to distance the country.38 These debates
were resolved constitutionally in the Insular Cases, a series of hotly contested
decisions whereby the Supreme Court legitimated the acquisition of colonial
territories.39 In fact, one of the often forgotten aspects of this era was how
strong the support for colonialism was among U.S. lawyers.40
However, the United States did not take the path of colonial empire
following the Spanish-American War. Instead, the outcome of the political
contest over the issues of colonialism left U.S. foreign policy primarily
embracing other forms of indirect and consensual engagement with foreign
legal systems. While many, like Goodnow, had seen the compatibility of
legal science with forms of colonial administration, they had to adapt quickly
to foreign legal reform work predicated on a very different form of
engagement, one dictated by the eventual victors in the political battle over
expansionism. These victors, generally associated with Woodrow Wilson’s
presidential administration, favored a view of indirect, yet still eminently
paternalistic, foreign engagement that overtly eschewed colonialism.41
Thus, while many early internationalists had focused their energies on
developing colonial administrations for the newly acquired U.S. territories,
the U.S. government and a swath of private organizations began to fund
efforts to shape foreign legal development fully divorced from the usurpation
of local sovereignty.42 From the outset, such work was cloaked with language
intended to differentiate the U.S. lawyer abroad from his colonial European,
especially British, counterpart.43 Historian Paul Carrington has cataloged
many of these early efforts, capturing how legal reform projects became tied
38
See AMY KAPLAN, THE ANARCHY OF EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF U.S. CULTURE 7 (2005); Roger
Bresnahan, Islands in Our Minds, in REFLECTION ON ORIENTALISM 57 (Warren Cohen ed., 1983); see
generally, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY (Abraham Lowenthal ed., 1991). For the formal policy against
colonial language in the Philippines, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS
LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE ch. 6 (2010); STANLEY KARNOW, IN OUR IMAGE (1989).
39
Most of these new territories had various “Organic Acts” which provided a constitutional
infrastructure. Citizens in these territories resurrected old constitutional questions about the rights of
foreign citizens under American jurisdiction abroad. See Ross v. United States, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); see
generally JAMES KERR, THE INSULAR CASES (1982); BARTHOLOMEW SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND
THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006).
40
See, e.g., Simeon Baldwin, The Historic Policy of the US as to Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 390
(1894); John Burgess, How May the U.S. Govern its Extra-Continental Territory?, 14 POL. SCI. Q. 1
(1899); Christopher Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1898); James
Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1898); Carman Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of
Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1898).
41
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 38.
42
See generally Kroncke, supra note 8.
43
Legal reform was an original British justification for colonialism. See HANS S. PAWLISCH, SIR
JOHN DAVIES AND THE CONQUEST OF IRELAND (1985); MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL
ORDER (1985); NICHOLAS B. DIRKS, THE SCANDAL OF EMPIRE (2006); BERNARD PORTER, EMPIRE AND
SUPEREMPIRE (2006).
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to the growing presence of U.S. lawyers across the globe.44 Furthermore, this
era witnessed the near domination of U.S. foreign policy by lawyers who,
while often divided on issues of international law, shared a common belief in
the role of U.S. lawyers as foreign reformers.45
The rapid proliferation of U.S. engagements with foreign legal reform
at this time was intrinsically tied to the main idea that animated Goodnow’s
work: that law was best understood as a scientific enterprise. Often linked at
this time to popular theories of legal evolution,46 many U.S. lawyers
expressed great confidence that not only could law be used instrumentally to
effect social change at home, but that the universality of legal science could
achieve the same ends abroad. These new instrumentalist views of law used
the presumption of scientific validity to argue that legal development was best
considered the province of legal expertise rather than of political deliberation
and process.47
The notion of law as legal science had profound effects on U.S. law and
transformed the U.S. legal profession at the turn of the twentieth century.48
The authority and legitimacy of law as a distinct science led to fundamental
changes in U.S. legal education,49 the development of modern bar
associations,50 and nationalized legal practice.51 Yet still, no aspect of U.S.
law was seen as more central than its Constitution.52
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PAUL CARRINGTON, SPREADING AMERICA’S WORD 1 (2005) (describing those who have “striven
to make the governments and laws of other peoples more like their own”).
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Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the
New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 239 (2003) [hereinafter Gilded Age]; Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping
of American Foreign Policy: The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 583 (2004) [hereinafter Twenty
Years’ Crisis].
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See, e.g., LEWIS HENRY MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY (1877); BROOK ADAMS, THE LAW OF
CIVILIZATION AND DECAY (1896); see also Steven Wilf, The Invention of Legal Primitivism, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 485 (2009).
47
See ROBERT WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1 (1967) (describing the “new scientific gospel”);
see also Anderson, supra note 24.
48
See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 43-44 (1989); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 526 (2005).
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See generally WILLIAM LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN LEGAL
EDUCATION (1994); Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model of Natural Sciences in
Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (1999).
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Edward Gee & Donald Jackson, American Legal Education and the Bar: Hand in Hand or Fist in
Glove?, 4 LEARNING & L. 34 (1977); Thomas Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 36 (1983);
Harry Frist, Competition in the Legal Education Industry, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311 (1978).
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See William Novak, The Legal Origins of the American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S
CENTURY 267 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth, & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002). The nationalization of legal
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The sum force of these shifts was the emergence of a new popular
image of “American lawyers” and of the institutions that produced them.
Even though many of these developments in U.S. law were hotly contested at
the time,53 the allure of law as an apolitical exertion of expertise eventually
consumed the profession.54 While there was, and still is, a great deal of
underlying diversity in U.S. legal practice, a newly standardized template
could be offered up abroad as to what constituted the prototypical U.S.
lawyer.
C.

From Colonial Administrator to Comparative Constitutionalist

During the first decade of the twentieth century, Goodnow’s star
continued to steadily rise.55 It was at this time that his relationship with
Woodrow Wilson and other leading legal scholars garnered him the first
presidency of APSA, then a leading center for the study of international and
comparative law. At the same time, he founded the Internationale de Droit
Public. In 1906, he was named Dean of the Political Science Department at
Columbia and was selected as a member of a range of increasingly influential
academic societies. His influence outside of academia also expanded rapidly.
He became the first Chairman of the Institute of Governmental Research
(later the Brookings Institute), and he was invited to serve on the boards of
other such “think tanks.” He traveled to England for the National Civic
Federation’s Commission on Public Ownership, and in 1911 he was recruited
by President Taft to serve on his Commission on Efficiency and Economy.
Goodnow’s success as a public and private institutional actor did not
dull his scholarly activity. Turning from his early focus on administrative law,
he came to increasingly focus on constitutional reform. In 1911, he published
Social Reform and the Constitution, in which he directly singled out the U.S.
Constitution as a relic that hindered social progress.56 Furthermore, Goodnow
claimed that the Bill of Rights was emblematic of this anachronistic state, as

53
See generally WILLIAM JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF
PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 177 (1978).
54
MORTON HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 256 (1977) (arguing that
“the desire to separate law and politics has always been a central aspiration of the American legal
profession”); see also Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
55
As mentioned above, biographical information about Frank Goodnow comes from primary source
materials located in the archives of Johns Hopkins University. GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14.
56
FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION v (1911) (asserting that the
purpose of the work is “to ascertain . . . to what extent the Constitution of the United States in its present
form is a bar to the adoption of the most important social reform measures which have been made parts of
the reform program of the most progressive peoples of the present day”).
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it was created for “eighteenth-century conditions, and has therefore no regard
for existing social needs.”57
Goodnow also made clear in Social Reform and the Constitution his
deep concern that the traditional structure of U.S. federalism was out of step
with social reality: “the experience of the civilized world since our
constitution was adopted is opposed to a system of federal government which
fixes unalterably in accordance with some political theory of universal
application the jurisdiction of national and state governments.”58 Leaving no
sacred ground unprofaned, Goodnow ended the book with a spirited critique
of judicial review in much the anti-Lochnerite fashion of the day.59 This won
him few new supporters in the emerging professional legal academy, but it
increased his esteem among the new Wilsonian establishment.60
Critically, Goodnow renewed his emphasis on a cosmopolitan
comparativism, and he placed parochialism and civilizational development
squarely at odds. He rejected most of his critics as being inherently antiscientific:
For one reason or another the people of the United States came
soon to regard with an almost superstitious reverence the
document into which this general scheme of government was
incorporated, and many considered, and even now consider, that
scheme, as they conceive it, to be the last word which can be
said as to the proper form of government—a form believed to
be suited to all times and conditions.61
Overlooked in previous studies, Goodnow’s interest in domestic
constitutional reform was at the same time comingled with a deep, decadelong interest in the study of colonial administration.62 Like the host of U.S.
57

Id. at 17.
Id. at 13.
For a revisionist update on the politics of Lochner, see DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING
LOCHNER (2011).
60
The standard accounts of Goodnow’s scholarship instead usually emphasize his work on
municipal governance as the new ground he broke during this early decade. See AXEL SCHAFER,
AMERICAN PROGRESSIVES AND GERMAN SOCIAL REFORM 98 (2000).
61
GOODNOW, supra note 56, at 9-10. Thus, he concluded that the rise of the administrative state was
a scientific inevitability given a rational approach to legal development—and that dissent would only retard
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modern civilization.” Id. at 359.
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Progressive scholar-lawyer and colonial administrator, noting that Goodnow was critical of Reinsch’s 1905
work COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION. See Brian Schmidt, Paul S. Reinsch & the Study of Imperialism and
Internationalism, in IMPERIALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 63 (David Long & Brian Schmidt eds., 2005).
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reformers across the political spectrum who had leapt to undertake reform in
the United States’ post-1898 territories, Goodnow had become entranced by
the notion that his scientific expertise could not only regenerate the United
States, but also foreign legal systems. In unambiguous terms, Goodnow’s
early interest presumed that America was to become a colonial power
following the constitutional basis for empire established in the Insular Cases.
Inherent in this position was Goodnow’s adoption of strong evolutionary
presumptions that helped mediate the tensions between his comparativism and
his universalism.63
In fact, following the larger relationship between Progressive thought
and U.S. colonial administration, Goodnow appears to have spent the majority
of the decade prior to his appointment in China applying his general methods
and insights outside of the United States.64 Between 1902 and 1909,
Goodnow lectured widely on colonial administration and traveled to a number
of U.S. territories. He corresponded with an array of colonial officials
including Samuel Gromer, then Treasurer of Puerto Rico. Many of his early
interactions with other members of the American Political Science
Association, such as Westel Willoughby and Woodrow Wilson himself, were
in dialogue over their various roles in colonial administration.65
It is likely that Goodnow’s deep interest in colonial administration has
remained overlooked due to the fact that none of his own works on the subject
were ever published. In fact, the only available copies of his writings on
colonial administration are stored in his personal archive at Johns Hopkins
University, and even today there is no extant scholarly reference to these
writings. Nevertheless, the quantity of material Goodnow produced in this
vein is quite significant. He wrote two papers on U.S. dependencies that
survive today, The U.S. System of Governing Dependencies66 and Governing
Dependencies: The Philippines.67 These articles are characteristic of
Goodnow’s broader research in that they draw on a comparative analysis of

63

“[I]t is believed that the real political institutions of different peoples at the same stage of
intelligence and morality will show a great similarity, even where the external forms of government appear
very different. This similarity is due . . . to the fact that after all man is man everywhere at all times, and
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Goodnow is listed by Anderson as a key example of the transnational mutualism of Progressiveera reform work. ANDERSON, supra note 24, at 19-20.
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Personal correspondence of Frank J. Goodnow. See GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14.
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Frank J. Goodnow, The U.S. System of Governing Dependencies, GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note
14.
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Frank J. Goodnow, Governing Dependencies: The Philippines, GOODNOW PAPERS,
supra note 14.
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the various “American dependencies” while outlining the way in which new
territory was acquired under the Insular Cases.
Even more striking, however, is the fact that Goodnow had prepared a
massive treatise titled “History and Principles of Colonial Administration.”68
This work incorporated the lectures that he had given in the prior decade and
covered the colonial experience of every major European power. The scope
of Goodnow’s analysis was broadly historical and included an analysis of the
settlement of the U.S. colonies and the earliest English colonial experiences in
Africa and India. It is here that he made clear the evolutionary context of his
worldview, establishing a clear bridge between the civilizing legitimation of
European colonialism and the U.S. administration of its dependencies.69
More generally, it was in the colonial context that he first contemplated the
wholesale re-creation of a constitutional order and began to draw on his
comparative constitutional work to imagine shaping foreign legal
development abroad.
In these writings, Goodnow placed the science of administration, both
domestic and foreign, as beyond morality. Colonialism, for him, was just
another social process that should be analyzed scientifically outside of moral
judgment. He was most critical of Dutch colonialism because he believed
that it was far too unscientific in its attempt to assimilate too quickly what he
saw as a culturally backwards people to European norms of law and
governance.70
Goodnow’s colonial writings place his invitation to serve as a legal
adviser in China in an entirely new context. It was not solely his intellectual
stature or personal associations that led to his appointment. Instead, by 1912
Goodnow was set to become a leading expert on colonial administration. As
U.S. law turned increasingly away from colonialism and towards the more
indirect, presumptively acolonial, methods of engagement abroad, the
colonial thought of the era, Goodnow’s included, was largely swept under the
proverbial intellectual rug.

68

Frank Goodnow, History and Principles of Colonial Administration, GOODNOW PAPERS, supra

note 14.
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Of note, in this entire manuscript only one reference to China can be found: “If they have
obtained a high degree of civilization, they will be enabled to wage war successfully against the invaders.
If their civilization is not so high, the mere fact that they are adapted to the existing conditions, will enable
them to labor so much more cheaply than the invaders, that no great laboring population will be imported
into the colony.” The citation referencing China does not appear directly in the text, but simply as a handwritten side-note in the left-hand column, “China.” Id.
70
While many of Goodnow’s exemplary methodological qualities as a comparativist are on display in
his writings on colonial administration, he never gives equal weight to the conditions and traditions in
colonial territories—only the European and American practices are noted.
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The Carnegie Endowment and Writing China’s Constitution

As great as interest in Chinese legal development has been in recent
years,71 it is almost completely forgotten that China was at the center of U.S.
internationalism during the early twentieth century.72 It was a time when the
new U.S. confidence of the era coincided with the increasingly dire political
instability plaguing China. For decades, the Qing Dynasty in China had been
wracked by international and domestic turmoil and it began to fully collapse
in 1911. Inspired by an unplanned revolt in China’s Hebei province, local
leaders throughout China declared their independence from the Qing and
began calling for a Chinese Republic in what has been called the Xinhai
Revolution. Suddenly, expatriate Chinese intellectual Sun Yat-Sen was
thrown into the U.S. spotlight as the presumptive leader of what many
thought would be an U.S.-inspired regime. Even though China was in fact
tangential to U.S. economic and military interests in 1911,73 Americans
became fascinated by the prospect that China was committed to emulating the
United States.
China’s potential “Americanization” so entranced Americans primarily
due to the influence of the U.S. missionary movement. The U.S. missionary
movement that grew out of the late ninteenth-century U.S. religious revival
quickly became the United States’ first organized institutional presence
abroad.74 It secured its presence and broad popularity through a wellorganized public relations infrastructure, and as the United States became
increasingly involved in international affairs at the turn of the twentieth
century, it was missionaries who shaped U.S. views of the world outside of
Europe.75 Nowhere had the missionary influence on U.S. life been more
manifest than in its great focus on China, which had long been the centerpiece
of U.S. missionary prestige and fundraising campaigns.76
Moreover, the U.S. missionary leadership served as a crucial vanguard
for popularizing the idea of indirect, non-colonial Americanization of foreign
countries. The long-standing missionary vision of transplanting U.S.
71
See generally STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO
(2000); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002).
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See MICHEL HUNT, THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (1983); CAROLA MCGIFFERT, CHINA IN THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL IMAGINATION (2003).
73
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38-39 (1990).
74
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75
See, e.g., CHRISTIANITY IN CHINA (Daniel H. Bays ed., 1996); see also THE MISSIONARY
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AMERICAN EAST ASIAN POLICY (1983).
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institutions abroad to stimulate democratic and capitalist development
appealed to both the non-interventionist and humanitarian veins in U.S.
politics.77 Particular to law, U.S. missionaries, often trained in both law and
theology,78 had long argued for the catalytic power of transplanting U.S. legal
institutions abroad.79
Thus, the christening of China as a republic drew the attention of U.S.
lawyers who carried forth this missionary spirit as they sought to demonstrate
U.S. law’s ability to spur liberalization and economic development abroad.80
Consequently, many lawyers focused on advancing Sino-U.S. relations as the
best example for showcasing the United States’ new humanitarian legal
internationalism.81
Yet, for all the fanfare that the new Chinese Republic received in the
United States, in reality, Chinese politics suffered from deep regional
fragmentation.82 Sun Yat-Sen and his revolutionary supporters, organized as
the Guomindang Party (“GMD”), were primarily situated in southern China.
Standing in the north, and still commanding China’s only modern army, was
General Yuan Shikai and the remnants of the Qing regime. Within a year, the
new government agreed to replace Sun Yat-Sen with Yuan as the President of
the Republic.83 The weakness of the nominally unified government led to an
ongoing period of great instability.84
As a result of this instability, the Taft administration was initially
hesitant to recognize the new Republic, and most European nations saw the
new regime as too unstable.85 However, expressions of sympathy in the
77
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United States for the Chinese Revolution became far less complicated once
Woodrow Wilson was elected President in 1912.86 Wilson rejected Taft’s
more conservative diplomatic strategy towards China and withdrew the
United States from the international banking consortium which had been
leveraging loans for political influence. He then quickly and unilaterally
granted recognition to the Chinese Republic.87 Here, Wilson’s moves again
reflected the deep influence that religious and missionary thought had upon
his views of law and foreign affairs.88
Wilson was explicit in his view that the United States was neither an
empire nor a colonial power, and he saw the U.S. opportunity in China as a
prime demonstration of this truth. Wilson claimed that when Americans were
abroad that “they must first take the disciplines of law” and “seek to serve,
not subdue, the world.”89 Moreover, Wilson believed that the Constitution
was a divinely inspired covenant with God and the United States’ crowning
legal achievement.90
Not coincidentally, Yuan Shikai’s rise to the Presidency of the Republic
was tied to his singular ability to manipulate foreign powers for his domestic
advantage.91 He recognized the character of the United States’ infatuation
with China,92 and was able to secure the admiration of key members of
Wilson’s administration.93 Moreover, Yuan specifically convinced Wilson
that he sought U.S. tutelage.94 In this vein, Yuan was quick to begin work on
a Chinese Constitution in order to help establish the international legitimacy
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of his regime.95 To help showcase his constitutional project to the United
States, he turned to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
(“CEIP”).
The Endowment, a subsidiary arm of the Carnegie Foundation, was
founded in 1910, and it reflected the dream of its founder, Andrew Carnegie,
that international legal cooperation could lead to world peace. Carnegie
selected Elihu Root as the first President of the Endowment, along with
trustees who were luminaries in U.S. politics. Jonathan Zasloff has argued
that Root’s views represented a more traditional understanding of U.S.
participation in international law that rejected much of the idealism of men
like Carnegie and Wilson.96 Yet, a great deal of Root’s other work at the
Endowment was guided by a belief in the new view of the U.S. lawyers as
foreign legal reformer.97 As a result, while Root and Wilson did have very
different views of international law, their views of the United States’ role in
Chinese legal reform were in fact quite consonant. Here, the Foundation’s
work exemplified the type of private, civil society reformism to which almost
all U.S. lawyers gave their support.98
One of Root’s first acts as President of the Carnegie Foundation was to
send Endowment trustee and Harvard President Charles Eliot to China in
1912 to advise Yuan on his selection of U.S. legal advisers to assist with the
writing of the Chinese Constitution.99 In China, Eliot met with Yuan and
convinced him that it would be better for the Endowment to vet advisers on
his behalf. In this way, Frank Goodnow became formally introduced to
Chinese affairs.
After Eliot returned to the CEIP, the Endowment quickly conferred
with Eliot, Wilson and other trustees. Nicholas Murray Butler, then
Columbia’s President and CEIP board member, wrote in support of Goodnow
that “he is the best possible person because he unites the highest type of legal
scholarship with experience in affairs.”100 Wilson was another founding
member of APSA, and he had cited Comparative Administrative Law
95
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throughout his own scholarly work, having called Goodnow “one of the most
lucid of our [U.S.] writers.”101
Goodnow’s appointment ultimately
represented the new consensus on legal foreign reform abroad, as there could
likely have been no greater domestic critic of Goodnow’s legal scholarship
than Root. Root not only rejected the positions taken in Goodnow’s scholarly
work, but in many other contexts he would have considered Goodnow’s
Progressive legal views decidedly “un-American.”102 However, with little
dispute, in 1913 the CEIP extended to Goodnow a three-year contract, at a
lucrative $13,000 per annum salary, to travel to China and serve as Yuan
Shikai’s legal adviser and shape the drafting of a new constitution.103
Goodnow, like many Americans of this time, possessed a basic
familiarity with Chinese affairs. In fact, during the summer of 1903 he had
traveled to China and Japan.104 Given his renown, international scholars often
approached him for advice, and he corresponded with members of the
Chinese Legation in Berlin over the study of U.S. administrative law.105
Although little is known about their relationship, Goodnow was also a mentor
to V. K. Wellington Koo at Columbia prior to Wellington Koo’s storied
diplomatic career for China.106
Yet, Goodnow clearly did not have a robust academic or intellectual
knowledge of China.107 At first blush, his belief in the universality of human
governance made it less analytically pressing that he obtain a deep knowledge
of China’s cultural particularities. Nevertheless, his knowledge of China fell
far short of the standard he had held himself to in his previous work.
Furthermore, his acceptance of CEIP’s offer reflected what would eventually
become the most telling quality of his tenure in China: his shared
presumption that the technocratic expertise that was transforming the United
States could also transform China.
101
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Goodnow was not unreflective about his own lack of knowledge about
China. He wrote to Eliot prior to leaving for China about his “ignorance of
Chinese conditions.”108 Nor was he shy about this fact. In a statement to the
New York Times about his appointment, he said, “I have been to China . . . but
only to its outskirts. I have not been into the interior, and when I was there I
was only a casual visitor. I really cannot say what the scope of my
prospective task is to be.”109 But this evaluation of his own ignorance did
little to dampen his initial enthusiasm.110
Goodnow’s appointment was greeted with enthusiasm both publicly
and privately. John Burgess wrote to his former student with great pride and
in the lofty sentiment of the era: “It is a great opportunity, and I have the
feeling that you may be able to be to the China of today what Confucius was
to it in the hoary past.”111 Another long-time lawyer correspondent wrote to
Goodnow that “I am greatly pleased to see that the opportunity of the
generation in constitutional building has been offered you.”112 Newspaper
commentaries used similar language. One clipping Goodnow kept for himself
claimed that “China will be a vast gainer by listening to his counsel” and
“[h]is work at Peking will be in the highest sense a duty to humanity and to
civilization.”113 Not surprisingly, then, several ambitious individuals tried to
join Goodnow in what was obviously an elite posting.114
It is interesting to note that the Chinese government characterized
Goodnow’s appointment in much less grandiose terms. At the time of his
initial appointment, James Scott, secretary of the CEIP, wrote to Goodnow
108

REED, supra note 75, at 84.
Untitled Article, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1913, in GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14, at 4.
110
In a revealing exchange prior to his trip, Goodnow corresponded with William Walz. Walz was a
law professor and he had served as an adviser to the Japanese government. He urged Goodnow to embrace
his appointment, invoking the basic presumptions of the new internationalism. Walz claimed that there
were “great opportunities for usefulness offered to an American in such a position in the cause of the Far
East” and that “your mission to the Middle Kingdom is certain to be a success not only because you will
inherit the good will that goes to the American generally by reason of the just and wise policy of the U.S. in
the East, but also by reason of your special qualifications for the post of adviser.” William Walz to
Goodnow, Mar. 28, 1913, GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14. In a reply to Walz, Goodnow claimed, “I
have very little acquaintance personally with the East and it is a great comfort to me to read what you have
written.” Letter from Goodnow to Walz (Apr. 1, 1913), in GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14.
111
Letter from John Burgess to Goodnow (Mar. 2, 1913), in GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14.
112
Letter from S.P. Orth to Goodnow (May 25, 1913), in GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14.
113
Uncited Newspaper, Brooklyn to Pekin via Columbia, GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14. The
article also makes mention of Goodnow’s lack of specific Chinese expertise. It reconciles this with the
claim that “It is perhaps true that not all administrative methods good for the U.S. would be good for an
Oriental people. It is certain that many of our methods need only be examined to show their adaptability to
China’s needs.”
114
There is a long but mundane correspondence over the salary of Goodnow’s eventual aide in China.
See Letter from Victor Hugo Duras to Goodnow (Mar. 22, 1913), in GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14.
Others also wrote to Goodnow offering their services.
109

JUNE 2012

FRANK GOODNOW AND THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

555

that “[t]he Minister adds that the duties of the adviser will be advisory rather
than constructive, the Chinese intending to prepare their own constitution and
desiring an adviser to revise and modify the instrument so as to make it
consistent in all its parts.”115 This marginalizing of foreign advisers was
characteristic of China’s regimes throughout the post-1911 era. However, this
significant detail was drowned out in the otherwise laudatory language that
celebrated Goodnow’s imminent impact on China.116 Thus, in contrast to
Goodnow’s traditional portrayal as a casual neophyte, Goodnow arrived in
China armed with a decade of colonial study and a popular mandate that saw
it as his mission to help China progress to the ranks of civilized nations.
III.

GOODNOW’S COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AS APPLIED SCIENCE

A.

Comparative Constitutionalism as Scientific Enterprise

Goodnow arrived in Beijing in early May of 1913. It is unclear
whether he ever left Beijing, but from the beginning he and his wife were a
hot commodity in expatriate and governmental social circles.117 From his
records, he seems to have spent most of his time reading, and he formed few
lasting personal connections during his tenure.118 If his personal letters are
any indication, much of his life was more concerned with mundane daily life
than any grand reform agenda.119 Goodnow’s contact with the Chinese
government included periodic meetings with Yuan and an official affiliation
with the Bureau of Legislation, an advisory body attached to Yuan’s Cabinet.
He had no formal relations with Parliament upon his arrival, as they had not
been consulted about his appointment.120
On the ground, Goodnow’s life was functionally mediated by the U.S.
missionary community, and it was Charles Eliot’s missionary contacts in
China that formed the basis of Goodnow’s personal network in China.121
115
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Goodnow also developed a personal relationship with the first resident
Methodist minister in China, James Bashford.122 Later, Goodnow would
relate to others that whatever particular knowledge he eventually gained about
China was primarily drawn from missionary sources.123
Goodnow’s spirits were buoyant during his first months in China. He
agreed to teach a course on constitutional law at Beijing University in the fall.
He began giving lectures, which would be routinely published in both
English-language and Chinese newspapers. It was at this point that he
seemed most content concerning his influence on Chinese developments:
“The result is that I am getting considerable publicity for my views, which
was what I was after.”124 His most significant correspondence during his time
abroad was with Nicholas Butler, who served as his primary contact at CEIP
and for whom Goodnow served as a conduit of direct information about
Chinese political developments.125
During this time, Goodnow busied himself with a range of distinctive
academic writings on China. One of the areas that attracted a great deal of his
interest was the reform of the Chinese educational system126 and the
development of professional academies for Chinese civil servants.127
Blending various models emerging in the United States, Goodnow’s legal
curriculum combined comparative humanistic and technical subjects as well
as a specialized tract for judges.128 He even had time to research an article on
Marco Polo129 and another on the history of printing in China.130
It was also during this time that Goodnow began to explicitly tackle the
larger task of applying his legal ideas to the Chinese context.131 True to his
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comparative methods, he contemplated a hybrid government that “combines
the Asiatic idea of strength with the European idea of popular cooperation.”132 Yet, few of these ideas made it into any of his published work
except his emphasis on strong property rights as a core component of Western
prosperity.133 It is apparent from these writings that Goodnow planned to use
his experience in China to enhance the stature of his own ideas at home. In
this respect, he was participating in the transnational flow of intellectual
capital that Progressives drew from foreign work.134
The bulk of Goodnow’s initial work in China was focused on the
Chinese Constitution. The first official material he produced in his capacity
as an adviser was a critique of the legislature’s draft constitution. Ever the
proponent of centralized power, Goodnow claimed that the draft gave too few
powers to the President. He based his position on the fact that China was not
a homogenous country and thus not suited to parliamentary rule. In this way,
Goodnow expressed his characteristic belief in the universality of
government, though he had little familiarity with Chinese politics or political
traditions. Echoing the conclusions of his work on colonial administration, he
also used the Chinese example to criticize the transplantation of English
parliamentary rule to a variety of countries.135 Throughout his comparative
constitutional work in China, Goodnow repeatedly invoked his critique of a
strict adherence to the juris-centric interpretation of the common law and the
rigidity of the U.S. Constitution.136
Feeling that his early advice had not been heeded by the legislature,
Goodnow quickly took the initiative to write his own draft constitution.137
This draft emphasized a strong executive power while devolving less power
to the provinces, mirroring his distaste for federalism.
Shortly after Goodnow’s arrival, Yuan’s regime became embroiled in
conflict; after Yuan suppressed the rebellion, he purged the parliament. In the
wake of this rebellion, Yuan grew far more interested in Goodnow’s
Contributions . . . Asiatic Peoples Have Made to the Political Development of the Human Race, 1913,
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132
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constitutional ideas. During this time, Goodnow continued to write about
China’s optimal constitutional structure, emphasizing the need for executive
power in light of China’s lack of strong class interests.138 He also argued for
the utility of an advisory council to Yuan, not as a true legislative body, but
rather as a representative body to popularize his decisions.139
Under Yuan’s shadow, in early 1914 a new constitution was adopted
that actually incorporated a great deal of Goodnow’s draft.140 The text was
replete with claims of equality, privacy, and various liberal freedoms.141 At
the same time, it gave the president the power to confer “titles of nobility,”142
and clearly recognized the primacy of state power, including language that
rights existed “within the limits of the statutes” and “in accordance with the
provisions of law and ordinance” and “not in conflict with . . . discipline of
the Army and Navy.”143 Similarly, the Constitution called for government
transparency but added that “when . . . it is considered that publicity may be
prejudicial to peace and order, or to public morality, secrecy may be
observed.”144 Moreover, whatever aspirations the Constitution expressed,
there were certainly many leaders in China who doubted Yuan’s support for
its more aspirational implementation.145
B.

Comparative Legal Science and the Primacy of Local Politics

Goodnow’s early constitutional work in China was greeted with the
same broad enthusiasm as his appointment. George Morrison, Yuan’s first
foreign political adviser from Australia, wrote to Charles Eliot soon after
Goodnow’s arrival “[y]our selection has given universal satisfaction.
Professor Goodnow arrived here a few days ago and has immediately won the
regard of everyone whom he has met whether Chinese or foreign.”146
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Morrison also reinforced the importance of the CEIP’s sponsorship of
Goodnow, claiming that Yuan was a steadfast supporter of Wilson’s new
administration.147
Newspaper reporting about Goodnow’s efforts was equally consistent
and continued to glamorize his work. The Baltimore Evening Post claimed
that he was “making China’s new law” and reprinted his review of the
provisional constitution in full.148
Jeremiah Jenks, another leading
Progressive intellectual and then President of New York University, lauded
Goodnow’s work in the New York Times and claimed that his advice had led
to Yuan’s decision to adopt an U.S.-style Cabinet.149 In these accounts,
Goodnow, although a private citizen under the employ of the Chinese
government, was nevertheless portrayed as an agent of U.S. interests, with
Jenks claiming that “in turning to Washington and the American plan for
guidance, Yuan Shikai once more demonstrates the great wisdom, the true
democracy of this Moses of Cathay.”150
Goodnow quickly became a leading “China expert” in the United
States. The major luminaries of Sino-U.S. relations who came through
Beijing during this time invariably met with him. William Rockhill, the
famed U.S. diplomat, visited Goodnow and praised his work as the cause of
greater order and stability in China.151 John Rockefeller wrote to Goodnow
asking him to be a board member on the Rockefeller Foundation’s China
Medical Board, which was the Foundation’s first major project in China.152
The most notable deviations from this broad endorsement of Goodnow
were primarily personal and private. One friend made the uncharacteristic
statement that “[w]e need men like you over here more than they do in China.
Those ‘Chinese’ have forgotten things about the philosophy of life that we
haven’t yet learned.”153 Goodnow and his wife corresponded frequently with
their children, and his son David repeatedly queried his father as to whether
he would be staying the full three years.154
However, as well received as Goodnow’s appointment was at home,
and as productive as he was as a scholar during his early tenure, the popular
image of his work in China fell far short of reality. It was during this period
147
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that Wilson withdrew from the international banking consortium that had
been organized during the Taft Administration to make loans to Yuan’s
regime. Although part of Wilson’s self-perceived non-imperial stance
towards China, Yuan had used funding from the consortium to suppress the
southern rebellion, and Goodnow felt that Wilson’s withdrawal weakened his
position as an adviser.155
Concurrently, Goodnow’s developing evaluation of legal reform under
Yuan is revealed in his correspondence with Nicholas Butler. Exhibiting a
clear public/private split, what Goodnow disclosed to Butler in his private
letters was in sharp contrast to his public writings and claims. Early on,
Goodnow’s sense of empowerment in China gave rise to an imagined ease of
reform implementation which made the known complexities of reform in the
United States appear, at first blush, burdensome by comparison. However,
even at his most optimistic, Goodnow could never provide evidence that his
legal reform ideas were being considered and instead solely asserted that he
believed that his ideas had important supporters.156
Goodnow’s personal correspondence clearly reveals that his early
optimism quickly gave way to frustration. Writing to Butler, Goodnow
claimed that, “as I look at it these Chinese have hardly the faintest idea of
what a constitution is. They do not, I think, even know what law is.”157
Finding the country far more unstable than he had expected, Goodnow
lamented that “China is incoherent” and even when he submitted his draft
constitution he was agnostic as to whether it “may go into the waste paper
basket.”158
Goodnow’s dissatisfaction with China ebbed and flowed, but gradually
deepened over time. A month after he submitted his draft constitution he told
Butler, “My work is somewhat in a lull at present. A ‘lull’ in China is a full
stop. They are always at a lull according to our ideas.”159 No doubt
motivated by the fact that the Chinese did not move to implement his ideas,
Goodnow claimed that in China “individualism has been so rampant that they
do not seem to have any conception of social obligation.”160 Significantly, he
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cited the political instability in China as a reason to believe that “constitutionmaking has really ceased to have any practical political importance.”161
He told Butler that Yuan had expressed little interest in having students
trained in Western political science, and that even among the intellectual
classes China was totally disorganized.162 He further confided to Butler
several critiques of academic freedom under Yuan, commenting on the
ejection of students and professors from Chinese universities on political
grounds.163
Goodnow’s lack of direct participation in Chinese politics helps explain
why he was so prolific a writer in this short period of time. Not five months
after his arrival, he was spending most of his time preparing his academic
lectures. Again, he was hardly sanguine about the utility of his efforts as “the
lectures are rather elementary, but that makes little difference as nobody over
here knows anything, about constitutional or, indeed, about any other kind of
law.”164 He also made several notes as to his annoyance with the various
“fool statements” made by his Chinese audiences.165 Yet, Goodnow
continued to contemplate what the CEIP could do with its interest in China.166
It was early in 1914 when Goodnow was approached to become Dean
of the Johns Hopkins University (“JHU”). JHU was a leading prototype for
the modern U.S. university and a central hub for the elite of Wilson’s
Progressive cohort. The international circulation of political and intellectual
capital in the era was evident in how announcements of Goodnow’s deanship
often cited his China experience as a key asset.167 Goodnow accepted the
offer with little hesitation. However, his desire to terminate his China
contract more than two years early was initially met with resistance by the
trustees of the CEIP.168 Butler continued to urge Goodnow to stay in China
161
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because he worried that his departure would have a negative impact on the
U.S. image in China. He also told Goodnow that “some of the businessmen
here feel that American prestige in the East is at stake in your carrying your
work through to the end.”169
Yet Goodnow was adamant. He told Butler that “[t]he Carnegie
Endowment’s nominee is in danger of becoming merely a charge upon the
strained finances of the country and is not fulfilling any useful purpose.”170 In
a February 16, 1914 letter to Butler, Goodnow released the full fury of his
dissatisfaction with his time in China. He felt that the parliament was hostile
to his presence and “either refused or neglected to admit me to its
deliberations or to ask my advice.”171 He said explicitly that the Chinese had
no desire to liberalize or democratize:
Young China has lost control, the old ideas of Chinese
absolutism are now in the ascendency, the prospect of adopting
a constitution on western lines has been set back for perhaps 25
years; indeed such a constitution may never be adopted” and
“whatever course China did take,” it would “be little if any
influenced by foreign advice.172
Goodnow also highlighted how rising Chinese nationalism complicated
the work of advisers as “frequent complaints appear in the press of the heavy
and useless expense of foreign advisers.”173 He rejected the notion that he
was doing anything of particular service to America, or that his appointment
by the Chinese government was solely to secure recognition for the regime.
Summarily, he noted that many in China knew that “[t]he appointment of
foreign advisers is thought often to be due to their desire to please the foreign
nation concerned.”174 Perhaps part of Goodnow’s aggravated sense of
alienation was the fact that members of Yuan’s regime, who claimed to be
happy with, but seemingly indifferent to, his work displayed little resistance
to his leaving. One official actually gave the opinion that Goodnow would be
more useful to China as President of JHU than as a legal adviser.175
In his last letter to persuade the CEIP to release him, Goodnow roundly
condemned the Chinese government and the Chinese people. He claimed
169
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that, “[t]here is so much graft and corruption, so much ignorance on the part
of the mass of the people, and so little practical common sense on the part of
about all the leaders here except the President.”176 He also repeated his claim
that “the importance of the position of adviser to this government is greatly
exaggerated” because the Chinese had a “total lack of any idea of law.”177 In
no uncertain terms, he asserted that this rendered foreign advisers all but
useless in China:
My feeling was and is that the Chinese, the experience of all the
advisers here would seem to show, have really no serious
intention of following the advice of their advisers, unless that
advice agrees with their own conclusions. Indeed, they regard
their advisers as almost entirely ornamental in character and
seldom let us know what is really going on. All we do is to
write essays which are translated into Chinese and then what
happens to them Heaven only knows.178
The ultimate consequence of this state of affairs, Goodnow concluded, was
that any objective advice he gave would only be used to justify further
government power grabs:
This will not be because I am in favor of absolutism even for
China, but because my advice will be asked with regard to
some one point while the general problem will not be presented
to me. I am, thus, in favor of a strong executive, which they
know. I have already and undoubtedly in the future will be
asked to write opinions on that point and have already given
and will give opinions in favor of it . . . . I am therefore being
forced into the position of, to use the words of Admiral Tsai,
assisting to centralize the power of Yuan. This I do not
altogether like. For, although I believe that what China needs at
the present time is the strong arm, I would like to see the
Chinese making the attempt at any rate to establish a form of
government which may in the future develop along western
lines.179
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Butler and the other trustees of the CEIP eventually consented to
Goodnow’s desire to leave China and become president of JHU.
Nevertheless, he agreed to stay through the summer of 1914, solely at Yuan’s
personal request.180 Even when the 1914 provisional constitution containing
many of his ideas was adopted, Goodnow was unmoved. He told Butler that
the constitution in fact gave too much power to Yuan and that in the end “the
Chinese will not live up to any constitution that they adopted. It is not in
them. They have no conception of the rule of law. They have no courts
worthy of the name.”181 Yet for all his protests, Goodnow agreed to stay on
nominally as Yuan’s adviser even after he returned to the United States.182
C.

From Comparative Lawyer to Expert Propagandist

Goodnow returned to the United States at the end of the summer of
1914 to begin what would become a quite successful tenure as President of
JHU. What is striking about his activity in the following year is that he
continued to publically support Yuan, in both journalistic and academic
publications. He did not publicly claim that his mission had been in vain nor
did he question his own particular expertise. He continued to draw on his
experience in China as intellectual capital to bolster his own ideas at home
and he continued to give his personal allegiance to Yuan as the savior of an
otherwise dysfunctional society. As a result, as critical as he was of China
privately, publically he was unable to accept the failure of his good intentions
and technocratic ambitions. In fact, at Yuan’s personal behest, Goodnow
returned to Beijing for six weeks during the summer of 1915.183
During this year stateside, Goodnow’s quick departure from China
provided fodder to those who had been critical of Wilson’s approach to
China.184 Many were quick to point out the authoritarian nature of Yuan’s
actions and contested formal diplomatic recognition of his regime. However,
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Goodnow was quick to respond to such criticisms and shortly after his return
he began to play an active role in Yuan’s courting of international favor.
Goodnow was frequently quoted in both the local Baltimore Evening
Sun and the New York Times responding to criticisms of Yuan. In his
comments, he would often emphasize the Japanese example where legal
change in Asia was gradual and led by strong central leadership.185 Goodnow
publicly admitted that Yuan had no real checks on his power, but he called
attention to Yuan’s moral virtue and fostered the image of Yuan as a defiant
modernizer.186 Thus, by implication, whatever actions Yuan took were
justifiably necessary to pave the way for a permanent constitution that would
eventually be expressive of some form of representative, democratic
assembly.
Throughout his public addresses and academic writings, Goodnow
clearly affirmed the idea that China would soon “Westernize” and asserted the
superior efficiency of Western forms of governance over those of the East.187
He phrased these legal claims in broad scientific terms, citing evidence from
Chinese natural science, demographics, economic structure, and
agriculture.188 He used the authority of an objective legal science to shield
himself from normative arguments about what China should be doing, and the
claim that a proper analysis of Chinese legal development was one divorced
from morality.189
In this way, Goodnow never refrained from claiming that his work in
China was based on his scientific evaluations as a comparativist.190 He
recurrently presented Yuan as a reluctant wielder of power, whose hand was
forced by exigent circumstance. To this end, Goodnow repeated his earlier
critique of the first draft constitution as “framed with little regard to Chinese
conditions” and “based on the theory that a constitution itself would exercise
a controlling influence on political action regardless of the conditions and
185
“Of course it is true, that the President has wide powers under the Constitution . . . [t]his
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traditions of the people to which it applied.”191 He gave Yuan credit for
“Western” educational reform during his time in Tianjin and the creation of a
“modern army.”192 He described Yuan as being only “comparatively
conservative” when opposed to the “radical and theoretical.”193
When specifically addressing Chinese law, Goodnow gave faint praise
to “Oriental idealism”194 but claimed that basic rule of law principles, even
judicial independence, were far more important to Asia’s future.195 Goodnow
told his audience that the “absence of the rule of law” in China was
demonstrated by the limited power of central law to modify the unruly and
undisciplined nature of the Chinese people.196 Thus, while “China’s attitude
toward the introduction of Western ideas has been for the most part one of
hostility,”197 this “is an attitude which must and will be abandoned.”198
Goodnow believed that China had traditionally been “the home of
laissez-fare.”199 This independence and legacy of freedom was for him a
hindrance to progress, not a foundation for liberty. Thus, when it came to the
role of law in Chinese daily life, “laws and edicts have been issued to
supplement the force of moral precept and customary usage has usually been
deemed expedient to convince those affected by them of the reasonableness of
the action proposed to be taken.”200 This lack of social coordination formed
the basis for his claim that Yuan’s empowerment was simply the scientifically
observable outgrowth of Chinese conditions.201 His central example was
corporate law, which he cast as an essentially cooperative act where law and
social morality must mutually reinforce each other.202
191
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In fact, much of Goodnow’s specific claims about Chinese law were
generally well received by the U.S. legal community. Simeon Baldwin, a
founding member and one-time President of the American Bar Association
who had also taken on the Directorship of the Association’s Bureau of
Comparative Law, specifically cited Goodnow’s work as an ideal of
comparative work and his analysis of China’s financial institutions as a
“searching inquiry.” 203
Goodnow also used his version of Chinese affairs to highlight his own
critique of the inflexible and “superstitious” presumptions of U.S. legal
parochialism, now casting it as not only harmful to the U.S. domestically but
to China as well.204 Goodnow used critiques of his work in China which
supported Republicanism to reaffirm his claim that U.S. parochialism was a
hindrance to an expert evaluation of China, and support his anti-formalist
critique of comparative constitutionalism.205
Goodnow turned this anti-parochialism to the aid of Yuan by arguing
that bad news had to be interpreted with an eye to the gradual, teleological
progression of China as it shed the backward elements of its history. He knew
it was “of course somewhat disconcerting to the ardent republican who
regards a republic as a government of the people, by the people and for the
people” but reminded his reader that “China has never really known any sort
of government but personal government in accordance with immemorial
custom.”206 As such, “the problems of the present are rather those of
efficiency and stability than of liberty and popular government.”207 Goodnow
sought herein to accommodate Chinese culture within a universal frame:
It is extremely doubtful whether any real progress in the
direction of constitutional government in China will be made by
a too violent departure from past traditions, by the attempt, in
has grown up among the people which has prevented the misuse of their position by the officers of
companies for selfish, including family, interests.” Id. at 220.
203
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order to apply a general political theory, to establish a form of
government, which, while suited to other countries, does not
take into account the peculiar history of China and the social
and economic conditions of the country.208
Goodnow turned to this form of argument to support the power the
current Chinese constitutional had vested in Yuan using the language of
emergency power: “The adoption of the rule of law and the protection of
private rights” is thus important in “ordinary times.”209 Superficially, he
supported freedom of speech in China as “only where the press has a
reasonable freedom that private rights are protected and that progress in
popular government is possible.”210 However, he issued the caveat that this
was acceptable “provided [that] such criticism does not take the form of
seditious utterance.”211 Again, the essential circularity of his argument was
only resolved when he assumed the inevitability of teleological progress:
“China’s lack of discipline and her disregard of individual rights make it
probable that a form of government which has many of the earmarks of
absolutism must continue until she develops greater submission to political
authority, greater powers of social cooperation and greater regard for private
rights.”212
Goodnow buttressed these claims with sharp challenges to the expertise
of outside critics by drawing on his experience as an adviser. He stated that
“no one therefore who is not acquainted with the ins and outs of Chinese
political life can sit in judgment upon the particular acts of the President in
the great struggle which he has been conducting with such consummate skill
during the past two or three years.”213 In contrast, based on his experience he
could confidently “express an opinion as to the general result” that Yuan was
“bringing order out of disorder”214 and “endeavoring to lead China into the
paths of constitutional government as fast as her faltering steps will
permit.”215 Thus, in practical terms, he held that only a rare intermediary
figure like himself could correct both Chinese and U.S. misconceptions and
then divine the truth of where Chinese law was and should be going.
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As a result, Goodnow felt at ease making abstract concessions to
“Chinese traditions and history” and the “peculiarities of Chinese life” that
shape a “Chinese problem” while at the same time dismissing his Chinese
opponents as “denationalized” consumers of a naively idealized Western
republicanism who sought to crudely “copy Europe.”216 Pro-republican U.S.
and European critics would also need to recognize that until “the social and
economic conditions are quite different from what they are at present and bear
a closer resemblance to the conditions of the West, it is useless to expect that
a political organization based upon the conditions of the West can be
advantageously adopted in China.”217
This framework situated Goodnow in the role of universal critic.218 He
could declare that “China should be careful both to guard against the
enthusiasm of the recent convert to new ideas” while at the same time arguing
that his critical expertise was needed as “[China] should also endeavor to
avoid the mistakes of which Europeans have been guilty and, in the new life
which will spring up in the country, attempt to remedy those defects of
Western civilization the existence of which the most ardent admirer of the
West will not deny.”219
Goodnow’s writings thus reflected the mutualistic pattern between him
and Yuan, with Yuan gaining propaganda support and Goodnow drawing on
his tenure in China to bolster his intellectual stature and promote his personal
views in the United States.
IV.

THE NEW AGE FOR U.S. LAW AND GOODNOW’S FALL FROM GRACE

A.

The Transgression of Monarchy over Republicanism

The supreme confidence that marked Goodnow’s public discourse
continued to belie the deep cynicism revealed in his personal letters.
Notwithstanding his frustrating experience in China, he could not let go of the
ideas that he knew what China needed and that there was something he could
do to move it in the direction he divined necessary. He had quickly learned
216
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that he could not bypass Chinese politics, but he still saw a role for himself in
it. The lynchpin in his thinking was his relationship with Yuan.
The source of Goodnow’s loyalty to Yuan is not initially obvious, but it
was immediately clear upon his arrival in China. In his first letter to Butler in
May of 1913, he claimed that “[Yuan Shikai] struck me as a man of great
force and withal quite genial and kindly.”220 He would repeat this sentiment
throughout his personal letters in which he was at his most honest: “I may be
wrong, but I think he is honestly desirous of saving his country . . . He thinks
that this can be done only through what is practically autocratic government
and I am inclined to think he is right.”221 Yet, Yuan more often than not
ignored Goodnow’s advice, and late in Goodnow’s stay in China Yuan
became more distant. Goodnow even harbored suspicions about Yuan’s
eldest son: “Either the young man has taken quite a fancy to me or the
President is using this way to find out what my views are.”222
It is clear throughout both Goodnow’s public and private writings that
Yuan served as a logically necessary liminal figure for Goodnow. Although
Yuan was Chinese, but he was perceived by Goodnow not to be “Chinese” in
the ways that Goodnow believed stunted China’s legal development.
Goodnow felt Yuan was incapable of producing the expert knowledge that he
could generate, but that Yuan recognized his expertise and authority. In this
light, he took Yuan’s exceptional personal qualities and used them as the
medium through which his expert knowledge would be actuated in China.
When Goodnow returned to China in the summer of 1915, he produced
for Yuan a new comparative memorandum on republicanism and monarchy.
Ironically, this final act as legal adviser played out much as his earlier letters
foreshadowed.
The memo to Yuan that Goodnow produced would soon overshadow
the entirety of his career’s earlier work and arguably remains his most famous
piece of writing. Titled simply Monarchy or Republic?,223 what came to be
referred to as the “Goodnow Memo” (“Memo”) laid out the argument for
constitutional monarchy in China. Just a few short pages, the Memo distills
the various claims that Goodnow had already made in his earlier writings. He
reiterated that “the form of government which a country possesses is for the
most part determined by the necessities of practical life” and “seldom, if
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ever . . . the result of the conscious choice of the people of that country.”224
He made clear in this assessment that the republican system in China was a
failure, and that any sober-minded comparative constitutional analysis would
yield the same conclusion.225
Goodnow’s language in support of monarchy is equally
straightforward: “It is of course not susceptible of doubt that a monarchy is
better suited than a republic to China.”226 He focused on the inherent stability
of the monarchical system, which he claimed was required for China to resist
foreign subordination. In an obvious defense and approval of Yuan,
Goodnow compared the current state of affairs in China to the aftermath of
the American Revolution, when “had General Washington had the desire to
become a monarch himself he would probably have been successful.”227 He
then claimed that where “the intelligence of whose people is not high . . . a
republican form of government . . . generally leads to the worst form of
government, namely, that of the military dictator.”228 He discusses the “living
stream of continuous internal disturbance” in Latin America as his primary
examples.229
Goodnow set out conditions for the transition to a monarchy under
Yuan, emphasizing orderly succession, and warned that “the government will
never develop the necessary strength unless it has the cordial support of the
people.”230 Goodnow claimed that his advice should be shared by “those who
have the welfare of China at heart.”231
Prior to the production of the Memo, Yuan had been contemplating
declaring himself monarch for at least a year.232 Late in 1914, he began to
participate in rituals traditionally performed by the Chinese emperor. He was
supported by his conservative allies who favored stability for commerce and
international negotiation and who had grown weary of trying to appease his
political opponents in southern China. The delivery of Goodnow’s memo was
seized upon as a tool for publicly justifying the move. Yuan’s supporters
224
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organized what is now known as the Peace Planning Society or, as then
transliterated, Chou An-Hui. Yuan bought Western newspaper space to
circulate the Memo and legitimate his move internationally.233
In the United States, Goodnow’s support of Yuan’s move was widely
cited. In a New York Times article, Yuan Now Plans to Be Emperor, Yuan was
quoted as having considered monarchy only after he was “urged by
[Professor] Goodnow.”234 The article also mentioned that the Memo’s
authority rested in the fact that “[a]s Professor Goodnow is a citizen of a
republic, he is more competent to make such a statement than others.”235
Goodnow was portrayed as a close ally to Yuan, having “secured the
confidence of Yuan Shih-kai by advice given during former critical times.”236
As Goodnow intended, Yuan is portrayed as a reluctant unifier, initially
agnostic in respect to the issue of monarchy: “A certain doctor gave me an
exhaustive dissertation on the advantages and disadvantages accruing from
monarchical and republican governments. I answered him that, being the
[p]resident of a republic, I was in no position to discuss the question.”237
Goodnow was also quoted as assenting to this use of his Memo, as he
“did not mind his name being used by the Monarchists if it would assist in the
peaceful promotion of a monarchy and the welfare of China.”238 In a followup article just two days later, he issued the caveat that the turn to monarchy
“should be made acceptable to both the thinking people of China and the
foreign powers.”239
The circulation of the Memo caused a backlash in China. It drew fierce
criticism from a range of leading Chinese intellectuals, including former
monarchists Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei. Goodnow’s Memo was
attacked in China on many grounds, most notably on its omission of any
account of the actual instability of various monarchial regimes of the era.
Nonetheless, this initial backlash did not stop Yuan from officially laying
claim to the throne in December 1915.
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The Shifting Tide of U.S. Legal Internationalism

Traditionally, scholars have cast domestic U.S. reaction to Yuan’s
establishment of a monarchy as being one of universal disapproval.240
Indeed, there were many contemporaries who moved without hesitation to
vilify Goodnow after Yuan’s move. A representative example was the widely
cited book, The Fight for the Republic in China, written in 1917 by Betram
Weale, a long-time traveler and commentator on Chinese affairs. Weale
pointed out that Goodnow’s claims about China were based on his isolated
experience in Beijing and he chided Goodnow for rarely leaving the capital.241
Weale further asserted that the true leaders of China were “nonplussed by the
insouciance displayed by the peripatetic legal authority,”242 and he criticized
Goodnow’s claims about the “low political knowledge” of the Chinese
people.243 Weale rejected out of hand the notion that any foreigner should
question China’s movement towards introducing modern political institutions,
criticizing “the utter levity of those who should have realized from the first
that the New China is a matter of life and death to the people, and that the
first business of the foreigner is to uphold the new beliefs.”244 He reproduced
a tract by a prominent Chinese scholar who argued that it was wrong to
interpret Yuan’s move as legitimate, and equally wrong to take the
conservatives’ ideas and “now suddenly make a fetish of them because they
have come out of the mouth of a foreigner.”245
Tellingly, Beale also referenced more conservative elements in U.S.
politics and painted Goodnow with an anti-American brush. Beale stated that
Goodnow “[specializes] in that department known as Administrative Law
which has no place, fortunately, in Anglo-Saxon conceptions of the State.”246
Condemnation of Goodnow was also fueled by the growing
international network of GMD supporters.247 Tang Shaoyi, another Columbia
University graduate, had served as the first President of the Republic under
Yuan, but left before Goodnow’s arrival—having been quickly dissatisfied
240
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with Yuan’s authoritarian ways. Tang told the New York Times that
“Dr. Goodnow was used simply as a tool. He is a great scholar, a professor, a
citizen of a great republic, but he was duped by the monarchist faction,
because he did not have a real insight into the situation.”248
Yet condemnation of Goodnow was far from universal. A Columbia
University colleague, William Shepherd, reviewed Weale’s book and made a
much more dispassionate analysis of Goodnow’s work. He noted that Weale
was “distinctly belligerent in his attitude toward Dr. Goodnow” and that “the
kind of ‘advice’ that he is alleged to have given [does] not seem easily
refutable.”249 Shepherd did find that the Goodnow Memo, as presented by
Weale, “certainly does find strange misconceptions in it of English and
Spanish-American history in its applicability to Chinese conditions.”250
However, Shepherd defended Goodnow’s credentials and noted the growing
relevance of his expertise in common law systems.251
Reaction to Yuan’s ascension and Goodnow’s role were decidedly
mixed in the U.S. press. Editorials in U.S. and British newspapers friendly to
the Republican movement were critical of Goodnow, including his own local
Baltimore Sun.252 But other newspapers, from the New York Times to the
Washington Post, found no problem with Goodnow’s recommendation.253
Within China itself, many U.S. business interests still favored the stability of
monarchy, and Goodnow was defended in the pro-commerce Journal of the
American Asiatic Association.254 At the time, many legal scholars and
lawyers connected to China came to Goodnow’s defense. Firebrand
extraterritorial U.S. Court for China Judge Lebbeus Wilfley defended Yuan
and Goodnow, claiming that both were making an honest effort to build a
responsible government.255
Most of these defenses, however, did make it clear that, whatever
Goodnow’s recommendations were, in the end China would follow the United
States’ lead. Paul Reinsch, still Minister to China, claimed that Goodnow was
248
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innocent of charges of complicity, though insisting that Goodnow was not
consulted in the decision to declare monarchy.256 Reinsch further asserted
that Goodnow’s emphasis on fostering a gradual movement to elections and
democracy was prudent given the circumstances, and that U.S. audiences
should understand that Goodnow still felt that China would eventually follow
the United States’ lead.257
As such, Goodnow continued to be approached as a China expert for a
time after the Memo was issued. One lawyer told Goodnow that he still
referred questions about China to Goodnow because “[Goodnow] knew more
about China than any other man in the U.S.”258 Thomas Millard, likely then
the most famous U.S. journalist of the Far East, asked Goodnow to comment
on a draft of one of his early books even though Millard was himself a longtime loyalist to Yuan’s foes.259 Moreover, Goodnow was still invited to give
lectures on China, including for business interests such as Bethlehem Steel.260
He also continued his work on the China Medical Board and participated in
various reports on foreign educational systems commissioned by the
Association of American Universities.261 He even received requests to make
comments on papers about colonial administration.262
This diversity of reaction notwithstanding, the negative reaction that
had the greatest impact on Goodnow’s career was that rendered by the
dissatisfied members of the CEIP and the larger Wilsonian foreign policy
elite. Wilson was known to have been embarrassed by Goodnow’s
association with the monarchist movement, and Eliot and the other members
of the CEIP clearly expressed their displeasure with Goodnow when he
attempted to leave his post. Goodnow himself had stated that he anticipated
such trouble from on high when he returned from his 1915 trip.263 In contrast
to his Progressive cohorts who remained involved in foreign affairs, over time
Goodnow was blacklisted by members of the foreign policy establishment at
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the vanguard of the internationalism that Goodnow had resisted in message, if
not in medium.
The fact that those who were so disappointed with Goodnow’s tenure
failed to foresee the controversy that arose from his involvement defies
explanation. From the very outset, the institutional parties involved in
bringing him to China and the broader U.S. public saw him as a distinctly
U.S. agent. Yet he resisted the characterization, claiming at various times that
he carried no U.S. “mandate or mission for this country.”264 Most acutely,
any brief familiarity with Goodnow’s work should have given warning that he
had little identification with U.S. law, even if he considered himself a
republican citizen.
Progressives of the era evidently did not consider the possibility that
Goodnow would carry his faith in expert science to such an extent that it
would lack any conscious normative or national character. For Goodnow, it
was important that Chinese law go wherever science would take it. In
contrast, Americans had long projected an idealized image of their
governmental system as appropriate for China, where liberty, order, and
efficiency could all peacefully coexist.
The expectation that U.S. influence should be “Americanizing” first,
and carried out by any particular method second, can be seen in the complete
lack of global commentary on the role of Yuan’s Japanese legal adviser at the
time, professor of international law at Waseda University, Ariga Nagao.
Nagao, like Goodnow, was an eminent legal scholar in Japan, continuing the
long tradition of international law professors coming from Japan to China as
legal advisers. Furthermore, Nagao was Japan’s leading colonial theorist and
his work on behalf of Japan was understood within a very different national
discourse on China.265 Thus, like Goodnow, Nagao felt that a republic was
inappropriate for China and he worked with Goodnow throughout the
monarchist affair. Yet, few ever questioned Nagao’s role in the affair and his
recommendations generated little backlash in Japan or elsewhere.266
Woodrow Wilson professed great faith in Yuan Shikai, much as
Goodnow did, and shared Goodnow’s belief in the need for the tutelage of the
United States to gradually educate the Chinese masses.267 But if U.S.
influence turned China from republicanism to monarchism, it would be a
murkier claim for men like Wilson to believe that this was a movement
264
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towards Americanization. True, Goodnow still held fast to a general faith in
evolutionary progress, but he held a much longer-term view than the
emerging U.S. vision of a globe fully democratized in a few decades.
Notably, Goodnow never actually made any connection between Christianity
and his general study of law, much less his specific mission to China.268
Goodnow’s aversion to the incorporation of religion in his work is
exactly why he was lionized in an unpublished paper by Japan scholar
Kenneth Pyle, written in 1960 when Pyle was in the early stages of his
doctoral studies.269 Pyle portrayed Goodnow as a realistic bulwark against
unbridled U.S. idealism: “In America the advent of Republicanism in China
was greeted by an outpouring of naïve and self-righteous enthusiasm.”270
Pyle locates the negative reaction to Goodnow in the intertwining of
Christianity and democracy in the American consciousness of the era, noting
that “many believed that the prospects for diffusion of the Gospel in China
have been greatly enhanced by the advent of the Republic.”271 Pyle valorized
Goodnow’s commitment to science, which undermined the “proselytizing zeal
which sought to bring the democratic and Christian values of American
civilization to China.”272
Nevertheless, the fallout at the time from Yuan’s bid for emperor
became that Goodnow was removed from Chinese affairs and international
affairs more broadly. Yet, he retained some lingering personal ties to the
foreign policy establishment. He helped arrange for Westel Willoughby to
succeed him as legal adviser to Yuan in 1915, and, notably, Willoughby did
consult Goodnow after Willoughby’s own resignation for another
replacement.273 Goodnow even maintained his family ties to China as his
daughter married John V. A. MacMurray, who later would serve as Minister to
China and as the first Director of the Page School at JHU. There is also some
evidence that he maintained correspondence with at least one prominent
Chinese family. Moreover, for years Goodnow would pepper his speeches at
268
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JHU with references to the humanistic Chinese educational tradition, though
primarily again as stark relief to the pragmatism of JHU.
It is impossible to ignore the stark contrast between Goodnow’s status
within the larger political and intellectual foreign policy establishment before
and after his term as legal adviser in China. First, Goodnow’s work on
colonial administration was never published and his participation in the early
phase of Progressive Era foreign policy has been all but forgotten. In large
part, Goodnow’s academic production nearly ceased in toto when he became
president of JHU. Although such a high-profile administrative position
certainly could have preoccupied him, it seems unlikely that he would simply
put aside a nearly complete manuscript and a sustained fifteen-year interest
from sheer distraction. He gave a series of lectures in 1917 on his experience
in China; however, it was a decade before these lectures were published.274
Goodnow published two books in the two years after his return, but
neither of them focused on China or international affairs.275 Only one was
comparative in nature; Principles of Constitutional Government was simply a
collection of the lectures he had presented in 1913 at Beijing University.276
The text makes clear that in China Goodnow did not present U.S. law, but
instead his own views of global comparative constitutionalism, expanded only
by the inclusion of South African examples and an approving aside on
Japanese modernization.277 He included his trademark critique of the
“religious creed” of the rule of law and judicial independence in the United
States,278 of the persistence of federalism,279 and then took swipes at natural
law and social contract theory before declaring to his Chinese audience that
“[t]he American conception is in a way an obstacle to progressive
development.”280 Goodnow mentioned China in the lectures only twice, and
even then only in a relativistic nod to the fact that “the wonderful civilization
which has developed in China is in no small degree due to the fact that there
has existed in the China of the past one great state” and a brief comparison of
274
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the Chinese Revolution, not in popular fashion to the American Revolution,
but to the Civil War.281
Goodnow’s only other publication for the next decade was an article in
the Columbia Law Review on the League of Nations.282 Interestingly, this
article shows that he was clearly dubious of the capacity of international legal
institutions to achieve peace: “[internationalists] will still cling to the ideals
of the Roman Empire with its universal peace. They will at the same time
forget that that Empire was the result of conquest.”283 This critique has to be
considered with some irony in light of Goodnow’s relationship with the
Carnegie Endowment, an organization that predicated its work on the
establishment of peace through international law.284
Another indicator of Goodnow’s isolation from the foreign-policy
establishment is that during these years he made few, if any, new contacts in
foreign affairs. Furthermore, he was not invited to join any additional
institutional aspects of international Progressivism. He did continue to serve
on the China Medical Board, but this was likely due to JHU’s prominence as a
medical research center.
More direct evidence of this isolation comes from his personal
correspondence, which reveals that several individuals tried to contact
Goodnow privately about his China experience and were roundly rebuffed.
An aspiring legal adviser to China asked Goodnow if he had any copies of his
Memorandum. Goodnow claimed to have none.285 A lawyer-missionary of
the era, Thomas Rambaut, asked Goodnow for a copy of the Chinese
Constitution, which he believed Goodnow wrote.286 Goodnow again said that
he had no copies and clearly stated that he was not involved in the writing of
the document.287 Even when his colleague William Shepherd was writing a
defensive review of Weale’s book, which was critical of Goodnow, Goodnow
claimed that he could not find his Memo or any document related to his time
in China—nor should Shepherd expect to find it elsewhere.288
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There is evidence that Goodnow attempted to defend his actions in
China to other established foreign policy elites, though with little success.
While still in China, he had tried to persuade George Morrison of his good
intentions, but Morrison knew of Goodnow’s private views and found them
transparent and “most explicit.”289 Joseph Clarke, a former Irish Nationalist
turned Rockefeller Foundation man in Asia, recounted how even though
Clarke found Goodnow quite agreeable personally, Goodnow had also tried
unsuccessfully to convince Far Eastern expatriates that Yuan’s ambitions were
ultimately democratic.290 Goodnow even tried to absolve himself when
corresponding with Reinsch much later in 1921, claiming not Yuan’s good
intentions but Goodnow’s own impotence.291
Eventually, Goodnow shifted his focus to his duties at JHU where he
became widely known for his attempt to remodel U.S. general undergraduate
education based on European models. After his retirement in 1929, he
resumed many of the activities he had undertaken during the first decade of
the twentieth century, such as lecturing on administrative law and
participating in public affairs, but solely on the state and municipal level in
Maryland.292
Goodnow would briefly return to the arena of Chinese affairs near the
end of his term as President of JHU. Ten years after he presented his last
public lectures on China, they were reprinted in 1927 in a volume entitled
China: An Analysis. Strangely, the book is rife with natural science
references and reads more like an extended National Geographic article than
a treatise written by a once renowned comparative lawyer.293 When he did
mention law, he simply stated that the traditional Chinese legal system “for
centuries has not been a good one.”294 Notably, he mentioned Yuan’s regime
only in passing, describing the reversion to monarchy as “natural” given
ineluctable social forces.295
Reviews of the book were primarily positive.296 Stanford professor and
East Asian diplomatic historian Payson Treat, who himself had written on
289
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Chinese constitutional development prior to Goodnow’s trip, wrote a review
that, notwithstanding the non-legal focus of China, was published in an
international law journal. Treat called the book a trove of accurate
generalizations written “with, on the whole, striking success.”297
A. E. Zucker, a leading scholar of Chinese theatre, praised the book and
claimed that China should once again listen to Goodnow’s advice.298 Fellow
political scientist Harold Quigley judged the book as a thorough primer on
Chinese life, although he mentioned the curious omission of Goodnow’s own
experience.299
For a brief time after the publication of China, Goodnow started
receiving a few China-related invitations. In 1928, Secretary of State Frank
Kellogg invited him to again become a delegate to the Permanent
International Commission between China and America, an invitation
Goodnow quickly accepted.300 Walter Mallory, then Executive Director,
asked him to give a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations on the
GMD.301 Interestingly, Goodnow actually resisted the invitation, worried that
his presence would upset the GMD representatives who would be present.302
It is possible that some in the U.S. foreign policy establishment had
actually come to soften their views of Goodnow after the GMD had spent a
decade struggling to unify China after Yuan’s regime collapsed. At the outset
of the decade there was also a decline in U.S. enthusiasm for the Guomindang
in light of the growing Soviet influence within the Party. In the 1920s, one
member of the Far Eastern American Bar Association even spoke highly of
Goodnow in retrospect, saying that he was not a propagandist for Yuan but
had spoken honestly to the recalcitrant Chinese.303 The only hint of the
relevance of China’s fortunes on Goodnow’s temporary rehabilitation is a
negative one. In 1928, after Chiang Kaishek led the GMD’s Northern
Expedition to successfully unify urban China, Goodnow once again
disappeared from China-related public affairs.
It would be many years before anyone would mention Goodnow’s
China mission other than briefly.304 When he died in 1939, he was lionized
for the success of his presidency at JHU and for his early role in the
297
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development of administrative legal science. His time in China was
mentioned tersely in his obituaries, save Nicholas Butler’s quote in the New
York Times that “[i]t isn’t every day that a man is called to help mold a
nation.”305 Most subsequent histories of the era noted the “Goodnow Memo”
in the traditional fashion, and one of the few pre-1949 studies of GMD law
mistakenly cited Goodnow as having attempted to bring Chinese law in line
with Anglo-American tradition.306
Coupled with the initial diversity of reactions to his memo, Goodnow’s
blacklisting reveals the shifting shape of U.S. legal internationalism in this
era. While some still shared the same colonial assumptions upon which
Goodnow had begun his career, and believed that reformism was a poor
substitute for the direct transplantation of U.S. legal institutions abroad, others
were hesitant about the need for U.S. intervention abroad, especially after the
tragedy of World War I.307 Herein Goodnow was clearly a transitional figure.
He believed in the ability of a depoliticized legal expertise to shape
development abroad, but he had not fully adopted the Americanizing
presumption in which Wilson and others believed. While America would
become increasingly involved in Chinese affairs in the following decades,
Goodnow’s allegiance to comparative legal science would be uniformly
absent from the work of those who embraced the Americanizing line.308
C.

The Inevitable Pitfalls of Eliding Politics Abroad

With every passing decade, Goodnow’s scholarly and popular
reputation declined. Ultimately, the rise of the Chinese Communist Party
(“CCP”) in 1949 shifted Sino-U.S. relations away from decades of ever
increasing idealism about China’s potential Americanization.309 The
atmosphere in the United States after 1949 became one of recrimination and
blame as China turned from emulator to enemy. Chinese studies, subjected
for many years to political witch-hunts during the McCarthy era,310 emerged
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from 1949 set on explaining why the United States had “lost” China.311
Native historians were joined in this analysis by a flow of expatriate Chinese
intellectuals who had fled the mainland. Whatever absolution Goodnow’s
reputation had earned in the prior decades quickly faded, and he, once again,
became an easy target for recrimination.
In his 1961 biography of Yuan, Chinese expatriate historian Jerome
Chen repeated the trope that Goodnow was simply a well-intentioned but
naïve interlocutor.312 Chen gave credit to Goodnow for reminding Yuan of the
eventual necessity of establishing “something in the nature of a representative
parliament.”313 He recognized that Goodnow was chosen as an adviser for
China because of his then-eminent stature but “Goodnow, like so many U.S.
reformers, expected too much from militarists and warlords, who did not
understand or respect individual rights and constitutional government.”314
Another biographer of Yuan in the 1970s, Ernest Young, cast Goodnow not as
naïve but as rigid and unyielding in his thinking.315 Young was also critical of
the fact that Goodnow did not resign immediately when Yuan cracked down
on the GMD.316
Of all the accounts of Goodnow’s mission, Noel Pugach’s presents
itself as the most even-handed. Pugach casts Goodnow as yet another
example of a misbegotten Westerner mucking about in the mess of Chinese
domestic affairs.317 At the same time, Pugach was sympathetic to Goodnow’s
claim that he was misquoted and manipulated by Chinese officials318 and
noted that Goodnow persuaded the Peace Planning Society to make a public
statement that he did not support them—though only in the Chinese press.319
Historians would also differ in their assessments of the impact of the
Goodnow Memo.320 While James Sheridan’s classic diagnosis of Chinese
Republican-era politics gave Goodnow’s influence little weight,321 in sharp
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contrast, Xu Guoqi’s 2005 history of China’s role in World War I attributes
catalytic responsibility to Goodnow for Yuan’s turn to monarchy.322
Goodnow’s full fall from grace can be seen in a 1995 law review article that
describes him as simply “a middle-aged American law professor” who had
“stoked and garbed with quasi-legitimacy” the ambitions of the
“megalomaniacal” Yuan Shikai.323
For strikingly similar reasons, mention of Goodnow in Chinese
discourse today is equally dismissive, if not outright hostile. A China Daily
article in 1998 repeated the CCP line that characterized Yuan as a victim of
the imperialist American.324 Yet, in the growing diversity of contemporary
Chinese academic discourse, one can find a range of disagreement about the
significance of Goodnow’s role in the era.325
Judging Goodnow as an individual personality, however, misses
entirely how novel his role as foreign legal reformer was in U.S. circles.326
Goodnow was in fact distinctive as the first U.S. practitioner of modern legal
science to arrive in China with the belief that he had the capacity to directly
influence Chinese political development, and do so in a private manner
wholly apart from any official governmental sanction. Thus, Goodnow’s
tenure in China was the first major modern test of the non-colonial
articulation of Americanization abroad through law, and, significantly, by an
ostensibly private actor. Far removed from the lofty controversies of the
Insular Cases, here was Goodnow, a single man thousands of miles from
America, carrying the collective belief that U.S. legal expertise could be
transformative without any form of coercion.
Goodnow’s belief in technocratic legal expertise differed from those
whom his memo disappointed only in its comparative coherence. While
Wilson and others rejected the nature of Goodnow’s conclusions, they all
agreed that China was a place to, in Young’s words, “test theories and offer
the special wisdom of Western social science.”327 Despite his own
322
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frustrations over his tenure in China, Goodnow never seemed to contemplate
that he could not apply his preexisting expertise to China; moreover, his
critics never challenged him on methodical grounds. His greatest struggle
arose when no one in Chinese politics took his expertise seriously. His
comparative cosmopolitanism had its virtues, but its methodological
universality was simply not compatible with the parochialism of his
sponsors.328
Goodnow’s story, then, highlights exactly how this strange alchemy of
legal science and parochialism would contribute to the eventual decline of
comparative law in U.S. legal and political discourse. One cannot employ a
rigorous comparative legal science informed by the full range of global
empirical sources that recursively leads to the conclusion that the legal system
of a particular nation is universally functional, much less normatively
desirable. It is impossible to reconcile such divergent commitments unless
one presumes as a self-evident fact that the system to be universalized is
always at the evolutionary vanguard—an empirical presumption that renders
null the necessity of a truly scientific analysis to begin with. Nevertheless, it
was just such an evolutionary presumption that undergirded the notion that
U.S. foreign legal reform should always be Americanizing. Ultimately, there
is essentially no new comparative legal knowledge when every legal culture is
headed in a predetermined direction that remains consistently defined by a
single legal culture’s experience.
Yet, while Goodnow’s allegiance to legal science saved him from the
contradictions of exporting U.S. law as a scientific process, the
cosmopolitanism of his comparative constitutional methodology did not save
him because of his current belief in the depoliticized production of scientific
knowledge. Goodnow was seduced by the allure of foreign reform held as an
arena of depoliticized expert knowledge.329 It made no difference that
Goodnow did not believe himself to be an agent of U.S. republicanism, as this
only contributed to his ultimate belief that he was a culturally neutral agent
who could transform a foreign nation through the application of his personal
expertise and good intentions.
It was exactly this presumption of technocratic neutrality that was the
foundational component of Goodnow’s own failure. He did not fail because
328
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of the character of his intentions or the relative sophistication of his expertise.
It was his own self-confidence and the ends to which he defended his actions
and Yuan that made his actual impact on Chinese constitutionalism
meaningless. Thus, he can be rightly criticized for the stark public/private
split in his writings, the self-serving and one-sided use of China to support his
broader intellectual agenda, and that his experience abroad compelled him to
undertake little personal or intellectual re-evaluation.
This depoliticized concept was all the more significant as the
controversy about Goodnow’s support of Yuan and his recommendation of
constitutional monarchy was never, in fact, about his expertise, but about his
politics. He had even been warned by his friend Charles Bigelow that he
should be wary of this faith in depoliticized legal expertise prior to his trip to
China, noting that “that an illiberal and reactionary government cannot
dispense with a constitutional adviser any more than the large corporations
here who intend to disregard the law start out without the best lawyer of the
land in their cabinet.”330 In the end, Goodnow’s skill and commitment as a
comparativist could not save him from his faith in his ability to separate
knowledge from power and this led him to run afoul of politics on both sides
of the Pacific.
The power of this faith is shown in that Goodnow himself had decades
earlier made a strong argument for the professionalization and standardization
of the Foreign Service. He argued that people posted abroad should have a
strong particular knowledge of the politics of their host country.331 In his own
writings on educational reform in China, he noted that his curriculum for
public administration should be suffused with local knowledge, as “the
official can be successful in the circumstances of China only with the
evaluation that he is in touch with the life of the people with whom he has to
work.”332 Even more striking is that he repeated in many of his writings his
fear that Chinese educated abroad would become denationalized and out of
touch with Chinese concerns. But like so many other technocrats to follow,
he did little to actually learn about Chinese affairs outside of his very narrow
Beijing environment.333 For all his later study of Chinese topics, he was
always far removed from learning about the most important aspect of Chinese
society for any legal reformer: Chinese politics. He lacked insight into or
any critical understanding of Chinese politics and so committed the cardinal
sin of failing to consider its actors as capable, calculating agents.
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CONCLUSION

Upon final review, Goodnow’s tenure in China tells us little about
China during this era, except that many in China cared little for U.S.
pretensions even if they made use of them in international politics.
Goodnow’s failure did little to disturb such pretensions, as the actual fate of
Chinese Republicanism was of far less material importance to U.S. foreign
affairs than the symbolic affirmation of the United States’ presumed new role
in legal reform abroad.
Comparativists like Goodnow led the U.S. legal community to
increasingly view foreign law as a site of applied rather than critical inquiry.
There was little place for voices coming from China itself that could raise
new or novel questions about U.S. constitutionalism. With some irony, there
was ultimately no place for Goodnow’s voice either, as his place in history
became defined by the fact that he did not fully follow the soon to be wellhewn script of Americanization that would become the basis for foreign legal
reform work.
His time in China did not have any significant impact on Sino-U.S.
relations after Yuan’s fall, and in time the other U.S. advisers who followed
Goodnow would work not to disturb the agendas and assumptions of the
sponsors that praised their work.334 In fact, no U.S. legal adviser’s failure in
China would ever be seen as necessitating a revision of the vision of U.S. law
he or she sought to export, and this would in later decades become true for
U.S. lawyers all across the globe.335
By matter of contrast, consider the critique of Goodnow presented by
Sudhindra Bose after Goodnow’s 1915 address to APSA. Bose was an
Indian-born political scientist who was an ardent promoter of democracy, both
as an anti-fascist and anti-communist, yet also a critic of Europe and the
United States’ disruptive, if well-intentioned, impact on Asia. Consequently,
Bose found in Goodnow’s speech the curious but characteristic tension of
describing Asian societies on one hand as inscrutable—“Occidental people
find no end of difficulty in understanding and interpreting our Oriental laws,
customs, and institutions”—while on the other hand presenting a confident,
historically short-sighted judgment on Asian societies as definitely passive.336
Bose pointed out that Goodnow was attempting to reform China without a
self-critical position that recognized the internal turmoil still present in the
334
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United States itself during the era, or the relatively young age of the U.S.
republic.337
Bose’s ultimate critique of Goodnow struck precisely at the
Americanizing presumption: “We in the East ask only one thing of the West.
It is this—that you of the West stay away from us and our problems: leave us
to solve our own problems, to work out our own destinies, while you spend
your time looking after yours. The greatest good you can do us, the lasting
benefit you can confer on us, is to let us alone.”338 Bose clearly identified the
shared paternalistic and evolutionary presumptions of European colonialism
and the new forms of presumptively acolonial U.S. legal reform work.
Goodnow’s early view of his work as part and parcel of an U.S. colonial
administration reflects how many of the theoretical and empirical assumptions
about foreign legal systems did not in fact change even as U.S. foreign legal
reformers asserted their respect for local sovereignty.
Goodnow’s failure thus brings to the forefront the core question of what
exactly the aims of comparative constitutionalism, or any form of
comparative law, should be.339 Goodnow himself traded comparativism as a
mechanism for stimulating domestic legal reform for an externally-oriented
process meant to stimulate foreign legal reform.340 Goodnow’s story exposes
how such foreign reform work was premised on a one-way export of
knowledge that in large part removed U.S. law from international legal
exchange. Even for Goodnow’s Chinese interlocutors, he did little to enhance
their understanding of the quite-contested and lively debates about
constitutionalism alive in U.S. law during this era, but instead left them with
failed idealizations and bitterness.341
337
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As we consider the lessons that Goodnow’s story holds for
contemporary concerns, this marginalization of comparative law in domestic
debates seems far more problematic today as we face a global world of ever
increasing challenges that is a far cry from the rapid expansion of U.S.
influence in the early twentieth century.
While some may seek to dismiss Goodnow as unusually naïve or
hubristic, it is important to remember that he was not only a singularly
brilliant scholar, but also perhaps the most outstanding comparative lawyer of
his generation. As comparative constitutionalism once again becomes an
increasingly popular subject of debate in U.S. law, we would do well to reflect
upon the lessons implicit and explicit in Goodnow’s story. Especially
relevant in an age of increasing globalization and new and emergent
constitutional regimes, Goodnow’s actual tenure as adviser also demonstrates
how confidence in comparative legal science and depoliticized expertise can
often exacerbate the impact of local politics rather than bypass them. We
should be wary of an overly fervent commitment to legal science that
conceives of comparative constitutionalism as solely an applied field of
reform abroad.342
Further, the need to project U.S. foreign reform work as successful for
domestic audiences and sponsors presses reformers to misrepresent, with
well-intentioned but warping optimism, the actual shape of foreign legal
developments.343 The highly symbolic stature of constitutionalism makes it
especially ripe for the often only merely self-gratifying invocation of broad
allusions and sweeping symbolic formalism.
Thus, we need to pay critical attention to three claims that still have
seductive allure in today’s debates about comparative constitutionalism. First,
that there are “universal” principles to which all modern constitutions should
adhere.344 Second, that textual analysis of constitutional provisions is
sufficient for any analysis of a concrete system of constitutional practice.345
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Third, and most generally, we should be wary of our own exuberance and our
proclaimed expertise in assessing foreign constitutional needs.346
Moreover, although the historic influence of the U.S. Constitution
abroad is well-documented, we need to recognize that much of its influence
has been felt indirectly through emulation and dialogue, not imposition and
outright advocacy.347 This point is even more pressing as we face a world
where our own Constitution and constitutional debates are rapidly waning.348
At a time when our own constitutional politics is as rancorous as ever, we
should remember that simple assertion of constitutional exceptionalism is a
poor substitute for exemplification of good, and perhaps again innovative,
constitutional practice.
Recovering Goodnow’s story is but one chapter in a grander narrative
that describes an era of U.S. involvement in foreign constitution writing.
Notably, this is a narrative that has been understudied, even forgotten, or,
much worse, mythologized.349 In sum, as much as anyone may disagree with
Goodnow’s own view on constitutionalism, if we seek to recapture the vibrant
cosmopolitanism with which a younger Goodnow sought to energize U.S.
law, then we would do well to weigh this era and his own history against the
ever-seductive allure of shaping others instead of reshaping ourselves.350
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